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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Statute of Uses,1 if a gift of Blackacre was made
"to A and his heirs, but if A died without heirs of his body (or
issue), to B and his heirs," the gift to B and his heirs, taking
effect by way of shifting use and not by way of remainder, was
void.2 It was natural, therefore, for a court which wished to
save the gift to B to construe it as a remainder. This could
best be done by implying an estate tail in A, with a gift over
upon its expiration to B.3 After the passage of the Statute of
Uses and the Statute of Wills,4 shifting and springing gifts,
which of course took effect other than by way of remainder,
were held valid.5 At this time, if there was a feoffment or a
devise of Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if A died without
issue, to B and his heirs," it was not necessary to interpret B's
gift as a remainder in order to save it. Yet it was so construed,
the old law prevailing. If a chattel real were so limited, its gift
over to B was held void as an attempt to entail a term. No
case of such a limitation of chattels personal has been found at
this period.
In 1620, Pels v. Broun held executory devises to be inde-
structible. This decision necessitated the Rule against Perpe-
tuities, initiated by Lord Nottingham in 1682. 8 Thereafter, if
1 27 HE&. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
2 KALEs, ESTATES AND FuTURE INTUESTS (2d ed. 1920) § 26.
3 An early instance of such an interpretation took place in the 85th year
of Edward III (1361). There was a gift of land to B, to him and his
heirs, to have and to hold, to B and his heirs forever, if B had issue of his
body, and if he died without heir of his body, the land was to revert to
the donor and his heirs. B had issue, and that issue died V9ithout heir of
his body. The suit was between the collateral heirs of B and the donor.
It was adjudged that B had only a fee tail and that, because B had died
without heir of his body, the donor recover. Lib. Assis. 35 Edw. III pl.
14 (1361); BROOKE'S ABRIDGMENT, ESTATE (1576) 36, Taile 20; FITZIIER-
BERT'S ABRIDGMENT (1577) Taile 17. Such was the English law down to
the Wills Act of 1838. THEOBALD ON WILLS (8th ed. 1927) 208.
432 & 34 HEN. VIII, c. 1 (1540).
5 GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 135.
6See Child v. Baylie, 3 Cro. Jac. 459, 460 (1618); GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 5, §§ 155-158.
7 3 Cro. Jac. 590 (1620).
8 Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Cas.. Ch. 1 (1682) ; GRAY, Op. cit. supra note
5, §§ 169-170.
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there was a devise of Blackacre "to A and his heirs, but if A
died without heirs of his body (or issue), to B and his heirs,"
in order to save B's gift under the new rule against the creation
of remote interests, it was necessary either to construe B's gift
as taking effect at some definite near period, such as if A died
without heirs of his body (or issue) surviving A, or to give B
by interpretation a remainder after an estate taH.y To the medi-
eval judge the choice was clear, and the old method persisted.
This meant, of course, that A's death without heirs of his body
(or issue) signified a period whenever A's line ran out, no mat-
ter when. After future interests in chattels real and personal
were permitted in the 17th and 18th centuries, difficulties at once
arose as to the remoteness of the gift to B and his executors when
the devise of chattels personal or real ran "to A and his execu-
tors, and if A died without issue, to B and his executors."
Another related circumstance natumlly led to the legal view
that A's death without heirs of his body or without issue meant
when A's line ran out, no matter when, and not when it was
extinct at A's death or at some other'definite future time. For
centuries it has been the custom of solicitors in England in the
settlement of large landed estates to limit one or more estates
tail with remainders thereafter.I The common form of such an
estate tail was "A and the heirs of his body," and the customary
way to introduce the remainder after such an estate was to
adopt a form simil to one of the following:
If A--die without heirs of his body.
For want of such heirs of A's body.
In default of such issueL of A.
In default of issue of A.u
While the word "such" generally appears, some of the forms do
not employed the word.- Indeed, in the form given in Key and
Elphinstone's Conveyancing s both "in default of such issue,"
and "if there should be a failure of issue" are used.' It seems,
therefore, that it was a matter of indifference whether or not the
9 See ftppa note 3.
10 The best description of English family settlements is to be found in
WaLLjms, SmT7LEmrTS oF REAL EsTAm (1879) c. 15. It is not within the
scope of this paper to describe them in detail.
" The forms appear in MAMwx, FORMULABZ ANGCAN M (1702) 93, 398-
415, especially forms Nos. 170, 125-728, 745-749, which cover settlements in
the reigns of Edward I, II, III, Richard II, Henry IV, V, V'I, VII, and
VIII. Also in B=mGu", CoNvErANcns (1st ed.) 7, 63, 332; 7 BYrTH=MoD,
PRECEDENTS (1834) 363; 2 KEY AND ELPHINSTONE, CoNVEYANCiNG (8th ed.
1904) 599; White v. Summers, [1908] 2 Ch. 256, 271-72.
12 MADoX, op. cit. supra note 11, forms Nos. 725, 728.
2" Loc. cit. supra note 11.
' See also White v. Summers, supra note 11, at 272.
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referential word "such" was employed. Of course A's estate tail
would run out and the next interest take effect if A's line at any
time was exhausted. Thus, the remainder would become an estate
in possession when A died without descendants him surviving, or
if A's line ran ofit at any time after A's death, as when A's great,
great grandson died a bachelor.
Nothing could be more natural, therefore, to the English law-
yer of the last 600 years than to attribute to the words "die with-
out heirs of the body," or "die without issue," a meaning totally
at variance with the layman's idea of the expression.
Normally, when the testator gives an interest to a person and
his heirs, with a gift over if that person dies without issue, the
testator means that the devisee shall lose the estate only if on
his death he leaves no heirs of his body him surviving. But to
the medimval, and even to the modern, lawyer, a man died "with-
out issue" whenever his line ran out. This was the legal inter-
pretation prior to the Wills' Act of 1838. As is stated in Jarman
on Wills:
"Words referring to the death of a person without issue,
whether the terms be, 'if he die without issue,' 'if he have no
issue,' or 'if he die before he has any issue,' or 'for want' or 'in
default of issue,' unexplained by the context, and whether ap-
plied to real or to personal estate, (notwithstanding the distinc-
tion taken between these two species of property in some of the
early cases) are construed to import a general indefinite failure
of issue, i.e., a failure or extinction of issue at any period." 15
In almost every case calling for a differentiation of construc-
tion of this expression "dying without issue" the court was pre-
sented with the alternative of construing it as a failure of issue
at any time (an indefinite failure of issue), or a failure of issue
at the death of the first taker (definite failure of issue). Theo-
retically definite "failure of issue" means a failuie at some
specified time. By far the most common point of time found in
practice is the death of the first taker. As Jarman expresses
it, however, the event specified might be "collateral to the devi-
see," as in a devise to A and his heirs with a devise over in case
he should die without issue in the lifetime of B. Suppose during
the lifetime of B, A dies leaving a child who in turn dies before
B; has the event happened upon which the gift is to go over?
Crowder v. Stone -e seems to be the only case involving this ques-
tion. Lord Lyndhurst held that the gift over took effect.,' A
possible construction even here might be, that, inasmuch as the
testator could not have meant a failure of issue at any time,.
1 JARMAN ON WILLS (lst ed. 1844) 418.
16 3 Russ. 217 (1827).
17But cf. Nichols v. Hooper, 1 P. W. 198 (1790).
[Vol. 89
1930] GIFTS OVER ON DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE
he must-have meant that other failure of issue which is more
commonly referred to in wills, i.e., failure of issue at the death
of the first taker.
As has been pointed out, if there was a devise of land to A
and his heirs, followed by a gift over if A died without heirs of
his body (or without issue), A's estate was cut down to an estate
tail and the gift over became a remainder immediately follow-
ing.1s And, likewise, if there was a devise to A for life, followed
by a gift over on default of A's issue, A took an estate tail by
construction29 As an estate tail in possession could be barred,
turned into a fee simple absolute, and all interests thereafter
destroyed at the will of the owner, A was able at once to acquire
the whole fee simple entirely contrary to the intent of the testa-
tor.20 On the other hand, if the subject matter of the gift was
personalty, in which there could be no estate tail, the gift over,
arising, as it was said, on a general failure of issue, was void
for remoteness.2 1 It resulted from this difference between the
two classes of property that the judges were more prone in per-
sonalty than in realty to find on the face of the instrument a
special context limiting the gift over upon failure of issue to the
death of the first taker. And this remained true, in spite of
the well known principle that the rule against perpetuities should
not be employed for the purpose of construction.
It is necessary to consider what expressions have been com-
monly construed sufficient in England to cut down the generality
of the meaning of "dying without issue" from an indefinite to a
definite failure thereof.
(1) Where the failure of issue is stated to take place during
the life of some living person. Thus, where there was a devise
"to A and his heirs, but if A died without issue living B over,"
it was held that A did not take an estate tail2 A fortiori, if
the subject matter of the gift be personalty, a definite fa'lure
of issue would result.2 3 It would seem that the same reasoning
would apply where the gift over is to a person alive at the time
of the testator's death and designed to be living at the time that
he is to take. Thus, if the gift over is to survivors of persons
alive at the testator's death, the event upon which it is condi-
tioned should be held to be upon a definite failure of issue. This
result is reached if the subject matter of the bequest is per-
sonalty.24 But, if the will be one of land, Chadock v. Cowley 2-
18 THEOBALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 819.
19 Ibid.
2 A'VWLLMS, REAL PROPERTY (23d ed. 1920) 272.
21 2 JARrAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 427.
22Pells v. Brown, supra note 7, at 695.
3 Cf. Crowder v. Stone, supra note 16.
24 Hughes v. Sayer, 1 P. wis. 534 (1790).
25 3 Cro. Jac. 695 (1625).
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decided without sufficient reason that the common law construc-
tion prevails. On the other hand, if the gift over ir to some
one for life and there is no further devise of the property, Rowe
v. Jeffrey 26 has held in the case of land that a definite failure
of issue is meant.
(2) If the expression used is "dying without leaving issue,"
a definite failure of issue is intended in a bequest of personalty,
but an indefinite failure of issue in a devise of realty. It was
so held in Forth v. Chapman .2 7 Very little, however, is necessary
to bring the devise of land into line with the bequest of chattels
in this respect. Thus, the expression "leaving no issue behind
him" was sufficient to accomplish this purpose.
28
(3) Finally, it would seem, both as to realty and personalty,
if the expression "after his death," or the like, be coupled with
"dying without issue," a definite failure of issue is intended.2'
Unless there is some special language appearing on the face
of the instrument creating it, such, for instance, as an estate
tail in the first taker, a gift over on A's death without issue
should be interpreted as a gift over on A's death without issue
him surviving. This result was finally reached in England by
the enactment of the Wills Act of 1838,30 which provides:
"... that in any devise or bequest of real or personal estate,
the words 'die without issue,' or 'die without leaving issue,' or
'have no issue,' or any other words which may import either a
want or failure of issue of any person in his lifetime or at the
time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his issue, shall be
construed to mean a want or failure of issue in the lifetime or at
the time of the death of such person, and not an indefinite failure
of his issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will,
by reason of such person having a prior estate tail, or of a pre-
ceding gift, being (without any implication arising from such
words) a limitation of an estate tail to such person or issue; or
otherwise; provided, that this act shall not extend to cases where
such words as aforesaid import if no issue described in a pre-
ceding gift shall be born, or if there shall be no issue who shall
live to attain the age, or otherwise answer the description re-
quired for obtaining a vested estate by a preceding gift to such
issue."
AMERICAN STATUTES
In the 17th and early 18th centuries, estates tail were favored
in Virginia. Indeed, in 1710 estates tail were protected from
26 7 T. R. 589 (1798).
271 P. Wims. 663 (1790).
28 Porter v. Bradley, 3 T. R. 143 (1789).
29 Trotter v. Oswald, 1 Cox 317 (1787) ; Ex parte Davies, 2 Sim. (N. S.)
114 (1854).
30 1 VICT. c. 26, § 29 (1837).
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destruction by fine and recovery. In 1727 slaves were subjected
to the limitations iii il 1y being anAbxed to lands in tail to pass
wit the lard itself. In 1734"there -might be the docking of a
fee tail under ceftain conditioni. However, at the first session
after the Declaratio!n of Independence, the legislature declared
that tenants in-tail of land or of sia~eg'should hold them in fee
simple 1
Since that time many Amrnen n jurisdictions have abolished
by statute estates til..' In t vefity-thiree jurisdictions the statute
enact., that a Jimitaqn formeriy itufficient to create an estate
tail, now creates .it~pr a fee §inmple'absolute, or a fee simple
with an .eecuw ry mittation taking effect only if the first taker
dies. witlut- isuej Iiurvivjing, i'e ight states an estate tail
now. becoes-a life ste i.nthe first, taker with a remainder in
fee simple aksqlutein the net taker.' In three states it becomes
iu,estate. ti for,thelife:of the fist taker only, and then a fee
simple absolute in those who take by inheritance from him.
In only six states are we certain that estates tail exist today.32
"Virginia took the lead; not only Pf all the American states
but of EnglAnd, in abolishing by statute the prima facie mean-
ing to the common law of England of "dying without issue."
hI- 1819 it lassda'gtatute which- reversed the common law pre-
sl.mnion,,and'adot-tea the prima facie-presumption that failure
of.issue at t4. €eEa v1 of e person 1s meant, unless "the inten-
tion of such limitatioj e otherii4 expressly and plainly de-
- 2 BLAbKSTo4E, -oU=NTR= , (Tqale;. 1st Am. Ed. 1803) 116, n.
119; see 4 DAN's AnRmGMENT (1824) 621.
Thomas Jefferson was responsible for this enactment On Oct. 12, 1776,
"He obtained leave to bring in a bill to enable tenants in tail to convey
entailed property in fee simple. Two days latet he reported a bill doing
away with the whole system of entail. It was an audacious move. From
generation to generation lands and slayves--almost the only valuable kind
of property in Virginia-had-been handed down protected against creditors,
even against the very extravagance ot spendthrift owners; and it was
largely by this means that the quasi-nobility of the colony had succeeded
in establishing and maintaining itself. A great groan seemed to go up
from all respectable society at the terrible suggestion of Jefferson, a sug-
gestion daringly cast before an Assembly thickly sprinkled with influential
delegates stroiigly bound by family ties anl self-interest to defend the
.present system.. Records, of the times fail t9 explain the sudden and sur-
prising success of a reform,..which there was eyery reason to suppose could
be carried through only veryslowly and by desperate contests; we know
lttle more than:the strange fact that the -whole system of entail in Vir-
ginia crashed to pieces almost literally in a day, carrying with it an
aristocracy somewhat brummagen, but the only one which has ever existed
in the territory now- of the United States." Mo sE, THoL!mS JEFF0EsoN
(1883) 43; see 1 FisKE, OLD VMGINiA (1901) 40.
a? The jurisdictions are classified down to January 1, 1928, in LAW OF
POPEMTY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) Draft 16, pp. 7-11.
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clared on the face of the deed or will creating it." 33 The modern
West Virginia statute has, of course, its origin in the same act,
and it has also been followed more or less literally in Missis-
sippi,34 North Carolina,35 New Jersey, 36 Tennessee,31 Kentucky, 38
District of Columbia, 39 Maryland,40 Massachusetts 4 1 Rhode Is-
land42 and Pennsylvania4
3
In accordance with the English common law, New York early
held that "dying without issue" meant an "indefinite failure of
issue.44 This had been assumed in earlier cases, which held,
however, that a definite failure of issue was meant, because of
the gift over to a certain person as "survivor." 4 Chancellor
Kent seemed perfectly clear in his own mind that the common
law rule was the law of New York. Indeed, he thought that
the common law rule was based upon the intent of most testa-
tors.46  In 1782 New York had abolished fees tail by turning
them into fees simple. 47 The Revised Statutes of 1830 contained
the following provisions:
"Where a remainder in fee shall be limited upon any estate,
33 VA. REV. CODE (1819) c. 99, § 26: "Every contingent limitation in
any -such deed or will made to depend upon the dying of any person with-
out heirs or heirs of the body or without issue, or issue of the body, or
without children, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, shall be held
and interpreted a limitation to take effect when such person shall die, not
having such heir or issue, or child, or offspring, or descendant, or other
relative, as the case may be, living at the time of his death, or born to him
within ten months thereafter, unless the intention of such limitation be
otherwise expressly and plainly declared on the face of the deed or will
creating it."
34 HUTCHINSON, DIGEST (1822) 610.
35 N. C. Acts 1827-28, c. 7.
36 N. J. Acts 1851, p. 218.
V Tenn. Laws 1851-52, c. 41, p. 113, § 3.
38 Ky. R V. STAT. (1852) c. 80, § 9.
39 D. C. REv. CODE (1857) tit. 1, c. 48, § 45.
4' Md. Laws 1862, c. 161; Md. Laws 1866, c. 236.
41 Mass. Acts 1888, c. 273.
42 R. I. GEN. LAws (1896) c. 202, § 24.
43 Pa. Act. July 9, 1897, P. L. 213 (1897) Act 172.
44 Jackson v. Bellinger, 18 Johns. 368 (N. Y. 1820); Lion v. Burtiss, 20
Johns. 483 (N. Y. 1823); Wilkes v. Lyon, 2 Cow. 333 (N. Y. 1823).
4- Fosdick v. Cornell, 1 Johns. 440 (N. Y. 1806); Jackson v. Blanshan,
3 Johns. 289 (N. Y. 1808); Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12 (N. Y. 1813);
Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 382 (N. Y. 1819).
46 "I am inclined to think that in 19 cases out of 20 the testator really
means a general or indefinite failure of issue." Anderson v. Jackson, supra
note 45, at 401. He repeated the same opinion in 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES
*274. In Anderson v. Jackson, Kent had dissented and had reversed his'
concurrence in the opinion of Fosdick v. Cornell, supra note 45, which
held that the word "survivor" had the effect of restricting the common
law meaiing of "dying without issue."
47 N. Y. Laws, ess. 6, c. 2; Sess. 9, c. 12.
[Vol. 39
1930] GIFTS OVER ON DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE 339
which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of this
state, as it existed previous to the time mentioned in the last
section, such remainder shall be valid as a contingent limitation
upon a fee, and shall vest in possession, on the death of the first
taker, without issue living at the time of such deatlh" 4 s
And Section 22 read:
"Where a remainder shall be limited to take effect on the death
of any person "without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without
issue, the words 'heirs' or 'issue' shall be construed to mean heirs
or issue, living at the death of the person named as ancestor." 4
The revisers in their report to the legislature commented
acutely on the expression "dying without issue." They noted
the common law meaning of it and Chancellor Kent's approval
thereof, and said:
"In most cases, it is expressed that the limitation over shall
take effect on the event of the first taker's 'dying with out issue,
or without leaving issue'; and in these cases, it is believed that
the meaning which the law affixes to the terms, namely, a failure
of issue, at any period however remote, even after the death of
the first taker, is very opposite to that of the party by whom
they are employed." 50
Referring to the New York cases in Johnson's reports cited
above, they said:
"The tendency of the sect'ons that we have proposed to pre-
vent litigation may be fairly stated, as an additional argument in
favor of their adoption. Nearly every case that has arisen in our
own tourts in relation to executory devises and other contingent
limitations has turned on the question, whether the first taker
took an estate tail, or in other words, whether the remainder
were dependent on an indefinite failure of issue. (1 Johns. R.
440; 10 Johns. R. 12, 19; 11 Johns. R. 337; 16 Johns. R. 382; 18
Johns. R. 368; 20 Johns. R. 483). In all of these cases, the
struggle of the judges to support the limitation over, by con-
fining the failure of issue to the death of the first taker, is very
manifest."
Section 22 of the New York Revised Laws of 1830 has been
substantially copied in Alissouri,5' Michigan,52 Wisconsin, Min-
nesota,54 New Mexico,55 Alabama,5 South Carolina, T Georgia,*
4BN. Y. REV. STAT. (1830) pt. 2, tit. 2, § 4.
49 Ibid. § 22.
50 3 ANALYSIS OF REVISED STATUTES (1828) pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, p. 12.
- Mo. Acts 1845, c. 32, § 6.
52 IICH. REV. STAT. (18746) pt. 1, tit. 14, c. 62, § 22.
- Wis. REv. STAT. (1849) pt. 2, tit. 15, c. 56, § 22.
54M INN. REV. STAT. (1851) c. 43, § 22.
55 N. M. Laws 1851-52, pp. 377, 381, § 25.
5S6 AA. CODE (1852) § 1302.
57 S. C. STAT. AT LARGE (1853) 298.
58 Ga. Laws 1853-54, p. 72, No. 62.
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California,59 Nevada,"° Idaho,G1 Montana, 2 North and South
Dakota,63 and Arizona.64
Between the Virginia Act and the New York Act there is this
difference in form: the Virginia statute provides that the pre-
sumption of definite failure of issue can be rebutted by a contrary
intent appearing in the will, while the New York statute con-
tains no such provision and says, apparently peremptorily, that
the words "shall be construed" to mean heirs or issue living at
the death of the person named as ancestor. Does this strict
language used in the New York Act preclude the possibility of
rebutting the new meaning? Chancellor Kent has some language
in his Commentaries suggesting that the rule in New York is a
hard and fast one and unrebuttable.65 But no case has been found
in New York, or in any other jurisdiction, which raises this
question. It is extremely. unlikely that any such case should oc-
cur in a country hostile to estates-tail and where the rule against
perpetuities prevents remote limitations on indefinite failure of
issue. Nor has any analogy been found with respect to any other
statute laying down in absolute terms a rule of construction for
wills. It is submitted that just as the common law rule was re-
buttable by appropriate language on the face of the will,"6 so
the New York statutory rule was not intended to be any more
stringent in its application. If any testator were rash enough
in other parts of his will to say that he meant the expresdion
"dying without issue" to have -the old common law meaning, it in
believed that the New York courts would consider the statutory
rule inapplicable.
The writer believes that the form embodied in the Wills Act
in England and the Virginia act in the United States is the bet-
ter, and suggests the form prepared by Professor rnest
Freund,'7 with the addition of the proviso contained in both'
statutes just referred to, so as to read as followq:
"In any gift, grant, or devise hereinafter taking effect, a limi-
tation of an executory interest contingent upon the event of a
prior taker 'having no issue' or 'dying without issue' or 'dying
without leaving issue' (or using words of similar import), shall
not be held to refer to an indefinite failure of issue, but shall
be deemed to refer to the want or failure of issue at the time of
50Cal. Acts April 27, 1855, p. 171.
60 Nev. Terr. Laws 1861, c. 9, § 43, p. 17.
61 Idaho Laws 1863-64, p. 535, § 44.
62 Mont. Terr. Laws 1864, p. 479.
63 DAK. CIVIL CODE (1864-65) art. 4, § 477.
'4 ARIz. REV. STAT. (Civil Code 1913) § 4687.
65 4 KENT, op.'cit. supra note 46, at *281, note a.
66 See supra note 45.
67 This appears in KAzs, CASS ON Furm INt=msTs (1917) 635.
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the death of the person named as ancestor, unless a contrary
intention shall appear from the instrument creating it."
A classification of the statutes appears in a note.8
AMERICAN LAW APART FROM STATUTE
In a country so hostile to entails, it is surprising that the ex-
pression "dying without issue" should be employed in wills to
the extent that our litigation shows. The reckless use of the
phrase is probably due to custom and to the fascination which the
elusive word "issue" has had for the layman and for the lawyer
little versed in conveyancing.
6s (1) States in which the statute applies to all situations:
Alabama New York (see 5 infra)





(2) States in which the statute applies to wills only:
New Jersey Pennsylvania
(3) States in which the statute applies to deeds only:
California New Mexico (?)
Idaho (?) North Dakota (?)
Montana (?) South Dakota (?)
Nevada (?)
(4) States where the statute applies to real property only:
Arizona North Dakota
*Kentucky South Dakota
Michigan West Virginia (?)
Minnesota Wisconsin







In these states (No. 5) the New York definition of "remainder" would
probably be applied so as to give the statute a broad application to all
future interests. The,New York statute is as follows: "Where a future
estate is dependent on a precedent estate, it may be termed a 'remainder,'
and may be created and transferred by that name." N. Y. REV. STAT.
(1830) pt. 2, tit. 2, art. 1, § 11.
In compiling the above table there has been used a degree of dogmatism
which may not be justified by the future development of these statutes by
the courts. Where the act is apparently limited with respect to land or per-
sonalty or to a certain type of conveyance, the judges may strain to extend
its application by interpretation. And if that is impossible, the step taken by
the legislature may encourage the courts to repeal the common law to which
the act has failed to extend. This is a familiar process. See (1921) 34 HAav.
L. REV. 526.
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It is perhaps more astonishing that the phrase should have
here received so widely its absurd common law interpretation.
Many of such decisions, however, were made before the middle
of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, a goodly proportion of
those handed down thereafter involved wills of much earlier
date. Something is also due to the early legal education of our
judges who, like Chancellor Kent,'1 were brought up under the
influence of the eighteenth century English decisions and who
felt unable to break away from them even under a different state
of society.
A great majority of our judges have required legislation, or
some context upon the face of the will, to hold the gift over to
be on a definite failure of issue. Kentucky, Connecticut and Ohio
alone have been bold enough to accomplish this without either
of these aids.71 ' The Kentucky and Connecticut decisions
would seem to include both land and personalty, but the sub-
ject matter of the dispute in the Ohio case was land.71
But the great weight of American authority, both as to land "
49 4 KENT, op. vit. supra note 46, at *274.
1" Northcut v. Whipp, 12 B. Mon. 65 (Ky. 1851); Moore v. Moore, 12
B. Mon. 651 (Ky. 1851); Hudson v. Wadsworth, 8 Conn. 347 (1831); St.
John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 407 (1895) (land and personalty); Parish v.
Ferris, 6 Ohio St. 563 (1856); Niles v. Gray, 12 Ohio St. 320 (1861), ap-
proved in Anderson v. Realty Co., 79 Ohio St. 23 (1908); cf. Harris v.
Smith, 16 Ga. 545 (1855) seinble; Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645 (1889)
semblc; McAllister v. Elliott, 14 Atl. 208, 711 (N. H. 1928) acmbte.
-1 Parish v. Ferris, supra note 70.
The hostility in Kentucky to English precedents has been noted in GRAY,
TuE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 245 n.1. See CLEAYV-
LAND, HEWITT AND CLARK, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE iN CONNECTICUT
(1915) 921.
72 An indefinite failure of issue was held. to be meant in the following
cases involving land:
Arkansas: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark. 333, 129 S. W. 1101
(1910).
Georgia: Wiley, Parish & Co. v. Smith, 3 Ga. 551 (1847); Hertz v. Ab-
rahams, 110 Ga. 707, 36 S. E. 409 (1900).
Indiana: Huxford v. Milligan, 50 Ind. 542 (1875).
Kansas: Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 135 Pac. 682 (1913) semble.
Maine: Fisk v. Keene, 35 Me. 349 (1853); Richardson v. Richardson,
80 Me. 585 (1888); Skolfield v. Litchfield, 116 Me. 440, 102 Atl. 240 (1917).
Marland: Laidler v. Young, 2 H. & J. 69 (1807); Newton v. Griffith,
1 H. & G. 111 (1827); Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418 (1889);
Comegys v. Jones, 65 Md. 317 (186).
Massachusetts: Hawley v. Northampton, 8 Mass. 3 (1811); Hurlburt v.
Emerson, 16 Mass. 241 (1819); Parkman v. Bowdoin, 1 Sum. 349 (C. C.
D. Mass. 1833); Nightingale v. Burrell, 15 Pick. 104 (1833); Parker v.
Parker, 5 Metc. 134 (1842); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 3 Cush. 472 (1849);
Wheatland v. Dodge, 10 Metc. 502 (1345); Terry v. Briggs, 12 Mete, 17
(1845); Hall v. Priest, 6 Gray 18 (1856); Brown v. Addison Hospital,
155 'Mass. 323, 29 N. E. 625 (1892); Allen v. Truetees, 102 liass. 262
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and personalty,73  is in favor of the common law pre-
(1869) ; Hayward v. Howe, 12 Gray 49 (1858) ; Gilkie v. Marsh, 186 Mass.
336, 71 N. E. 703 (1904).
New Hampshire: Hall v. Chafee, 14 N. H. 215 (1843) soble; Merrill
v. Baptist Union, 73 N. H. 414 (1905).
New Jersey: Secquil v. Moore, 1 Coxe 386 (N. J. L. 1795); Morehouse
v. Cotheal, 2 Zab. 430 (1850) (reversed on collateral point) ; Chetwood v.
Winston, 40 N. J. L. 337 (1878); More v. Rake, 2 Dutc. 574 (1857) scynble.
New York: Wilkes v. Lion, 2 Cow. 333 (1823).
North Carolina: Moore v. Bradley, 2 Hayw. 142 (1801).
Pennsylvania: Haines v. Witmer, 2 Yeates 400 (1798); Hope v. Rusha,
88 Pa. 127 (1878); Caskey v. Brewer, 17 S. & R. 441 (1828); Clark V.
Baker, 3 S. & R. 470 (1817) semble; Burkart v. Bucher, 2 Binn. 455 (1810) ;
Wall v. McGuire, 22 Pa. 248 (1855); Doyle v. Mullady, 33 Pa. 264 (1859);
Rancel v. Creswell, 30 Pa. 158 (1858) semble; Sharp v. Thompson, 1 Whart.
139 (1836); Braden v. Cannon, 24 Pa. 168 (1854); Reinoehl v. Shirk, 119
Pa. 108 (1888); Duer v. Boyd, 1 S. & R. 202 (1814); Moody v. Snell, 81
Pa. 359 (1876) ; Pierce v. Hakes, 23 Pa. 231 (1854) ; Wynn v. Story, 38 Pa.
166 (1861) ; Criley v. Chamberlain, 30 Pa. 161 (1858) ; Covert v. Robinson,
46 Pa. 274 (1863); Ray v. Alexander, 146 Pa. 242 (1891); Robinson's
Estate, 149 Pa. 418 (1892); Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 Watts 447 (1840);
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Pa. 335 (1884); Vaughan v. Dickes, 20 Pa. 509
(1853); Arnold v. Muhlenberg College, 227 Pa. 321, 76 At]. 30 (1910);
Befistein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 45 At. 73 (1899); Graham v. Abbott,
208 Pa. 68, 57 Atl. 178 (1904); Amelong v. Dorneyer, 16 S. & R. 322
(1827); Irwin v. Dunwoody, 17 S. & R. 60 (1827); Hansell v. Hubbell, 24
Pa. 244 (1855) ; Horton v. McCall, 233 Pa. 405, 82 Atl. 472 (1912) ; Hack-
ney v. Tracy, 137 Pa. 53 (1890); Heffner v. Knepper, 6 Watts 18 (1837).
Rhode Island: Whitford v. Armstrong, 9 R. 1. 394 (1870); Holden v.
Wells, 18 R. I. 802 (1895); Osborne v. Shrieve, 3 Mas. 391 (C. C. D. R. I.
1824).
South Carolina: Clifton v. Haig, 4 Des. Eq. 330 (1812) semble; Mazyck
v. Vanderhorst, 1 Bailey Eq. 48 (1828); Graham v. Moore, 13 S. C. 115
(1879) semble; Mangum v. Piester, 16 S. C. 316 (1881).
TennPssee: Hamner v. Hamner, 3 Head 398 (1859); Chester v. Greer,
5 Humph. 26 (1844).
Virginia: Callava v. Pope, 3 Leigh. 103 (1831); Bells v. Gillespie, 5
Rand 273 (1827); Broaddus v. Turner, 5 Rand 308 (1827); Wright v.
Cohoon, 12 Leigh. 370 (1841); Hill v. Burrow, 3 Call 297 (1803); Tate
v. Tally, 3 Call 307 (1803); Carter v. Tyler, I Call 165 (1797); Jiggetts
v. Davis, I Leigh. 368 (1829); Tinsley v. Jones, 13 Gratt. 289 (1856);
See v. Craigen, 8 Leigh. 449 (1836); Roy v. Garnett, 2 Wash. 11 (Va.
1794).
7 An indefinite failure of issue was held to be meant in the following
cases involving personalty:
Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840) semble; Watkins v. Quarles, 23
Ark. 179 (1861); Gray v. Gray, 20 Ga. 804 (1856); Huxford v. Milligan,
50 Ind. 542 (1875); Allender v. Sussan, 33 Md. 11 (1870) senble; Albee
v. Carpenter, 12 Cusb. 382 (Mass. 1853); Hall v. Priest, G Gray 18 (Mams.
1856) semble; Vaughn v. Guy, 17 Mo. 429 (1853); Chism's Adm'r v. Wil-
liams, 29 Mo. 288 (1860); Davies v. Steele, 38 N. J. Eq. 168 (1884);
Paterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. 259 (N. Y. 1833) smnble; Moffat v. Strong,
10 Johns. 12, 16 (N. Y. 1813) sembk; Norris v. Btyea, 13 N. Y. 273, 280
(1855); Hoff's Estate, 147 Pa. 636 (1892); Clifton v. Haig, supra note 72




The expressions upon the face of the will which have been
urged to cut down the common law meaning are the same as
those noted above in connection with the English law.
(1) If the gift over is to a person designated as "then living"
or "surviving," the weight of authority in the case of land, con-
trary to Clwdock v. Cowley,75 is in favor of holding that the pop-
ular meaning is meant.e There is a substantial minority of
Wendel, 4 Sneed 646 (Tenn. 1857); Bovnnan v. Tucker, 3 Humph. 648
(Tenn. 1842); Chester v. Greer, supra note 72 (Tenn.) ; Nixon v. Rose, 12
Gratt. 425 (Va. 1855); Deane v. Hansford, 9 Leigh. 253 (Va. 1838);
Williamson v. Ledbetter, 2 Munf. 521 (Va. 1811); Callava v. Pope, 3 Leigh.
103 (Va. 1831).
74 The minority view is represented by the following cases:
Land: Clarke v. Turry, 34 Conn. 176 (1867); Harris v. Smith, 16 Ga.
545 (1855); Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645 (1889) semble; Moore v. Moore,
12 B. Mon. 651 (Ky. 1851) ; Northcut v. Whipp, 12 B. Mon. 65 (Ky. 1851) ;
Black v. Cartmell, 10 B. Mon. 188 (Ky. 1849) scmble; McAllister v. Elliot,
140 Atl. 708, 711 (N. H. 1928) semble; Parrish v. Ferris, 6 Ohio St. 563
(1856).
Personalty: Clarke v. Turry, supra; Harris v. Smith, 16 Ga. 545 (1855)
semble; Moore v. Moore; Black v. Cartmell, both supra.
7T Supra note 25.
76 "Survivor"-Land-Definite Failure Intended: Jackson d. St. John
v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (U. S. 1827); Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Day 517
(Conn. 1813) semble; Couch v. Gorham, 1 Conn. 36 (1814); Blanchard v.
Maynard, 103 Ill. 60 (1882) semble; Carpenter v. Sangamon Trust Co.,
229 111. 436, 82 N. E. 418 (1907) semble; Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645,
21 N. E. 191 (1889) semble; Deboe v. Lowen, 8 B. Mon. 616 (Ky. 1848);
Abbott v. Essex Co., 18 How. 202 (U. S. 1855) semble; Lyons v. Cotharin,
205 Mich. 476, 171 N. W. 406 (1919) semble; Gannon v. Pauk, 200 Mo. 75,
98 S. W. 471 (1906) semble; Gannon v. Albright, 183 Mo. 238, 81 S, W.
1162 (1904) semble; Pinkham v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226 (1876) aemble; Van
Middlesworth v. Schenk, 3 Hals. 29 (N. J. L. 1824) semble; Kennedy V.
Kennedy, 5 Kutch. 185 (N. J. L. 1861) semble; Wardell v. Allaire, 1 Spone.
6 (N. J. L. 1842) semble; Seddel v. Wills, 1 Spenc. 223 (N. J. L. 1843)
scitible; Howell v. Howell, 1 Spepc. 411 (N. J. L. 1845); Groves v. Cox,
40 N. J. L. 40 (1878).
Fosdick v. Cornell, 1 Johns. 440 (N. Y. 1806) semble; Jackson v. Blan-
shan, 3 Johns. 292 (N. Y. 1808); Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 382 (N.
Y. 1819) ; Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige Ch. 140 (N. Y. 1843) ; Cutter v. Doughty,
23 Wend. 513 (N. Y. 1840); Dumond v. Stringham, 26 Bart. 104 (N. Y.
1857); Langley v. Heald, 7 W. & S. 96 (N. Y. 1844) semble; Rapp v. Rapp,
6 Pa. 45 (1847) semble; Johnson v. Currin, 10 Pa. 498 (1849); Nicholson
v. Bettle, 57 Pa. 384 (1868) ; Ingersoll's Appeal, 86 Pa. 240 (1878); Stoner
v. Wunderlich, 198 Pa. 158, 165, 47 Atl. 945, 949 (1901) (realty) scmble;
Mebus' Estate, 273 Pa. 505, 516, 117 Ati. 340, 345 (1922) (realty to be sold)
semble; DeTreville v. Ellis, 1 Bailey Eq. 40 (1827); Selman v. Robertson,
46 S. C. 262 (1895) ; Lewis v. Claiborne, 5 Yerg. 369 (Tenn. 1821); Brown
v. Hunt, 12 Heisk. 404 (Tenn. 1873).
If there is a gift over to one for life after the gift on death without
issue of the first taker, the gift is conditioned on a definite failure of issue.
Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, 502 (1809) (land) semble; Stoner v. Wunderlich;
Mebus' Estate, both supra; Higgenbotham v. Rucker, 2 Call. 265 (Va.
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jurisdictions where the courts have held the other way.- But
if the subject matter be personalty, this minority is very small1 8
(2) If the gift over be upon the first taker's "dying without
leaving issue," the common law meaning still obtains in a bare
majority of jurisdictions.79 If the subject matter is personalty,
the restricted sense has been unanimously accepted8
1800) (personalty) semble. Contra: Newton v. Griffith, 1 Har. & G. 111
(Md. 1827) (land).
If the gift over for life is followed by a remainder in fee, there is no
presumption that a definite failure of issue is meant. Pennington v. Pen-
nington, 70 Md. 418 (1889) (land). Contra: Stone v. Bradlee, 183 Mass.
165, 170, 66 N. E. 708, 710 (1903) (land and personalty) semble; Todd v.
Armstrong, 213 Pa. 570, 62 Atl. 1114 (1906) (real estate).
v Caulk v. Caulk, 3 Pennew. 528, 52 Atl. 340 (Del. 1902); Huxford V.
Milligan, 50 Ind. 542 (1875); Newton v. Griffith, 1 Har. & G. 111 (Md.
1827); Farrar v. Christy, 24 Mo. 453 (1857) semble; Hoxton v. Archer,
3 G. & J. 199 (Md. 1831); Secquil v. Moore, 1 Coxe 396 (N. J. L. 1795);
Haines v. Witmer, 2 Yeates 400 (Pa. 1798); Duer v. Boyd, 1 S. & R. 203
(Pa. 1814); Caskey v. Brewer, 17 S. & R. 441 (Pa. 1828); Clark v. Baker,
3 S. & R. 470 (Pa. 1817) aemble; Burkart v. Bucher, 2 Binn. 455 (Pa.
1810) semble; Sharp v. Thompson, 1 Whart. 139 (Pa. 1836); Heffner v.
Knepper, 6 Watts 18 (Pa. 1837); Braden v. Cannon, 24 Pa. 168 (1854);
Wall v. Maguire, 24 Pa. 248 (1855); Rancel v. Creswell, 30 Pa. 158 (1858)
semble; Doyle v. Mullady, 33 Pa. 264 (1859); Moody v. Snell, 81 Pa. 359
(1876); Hope v. Rusha, 88 Pa. 127 (1878); Reinoehl v. Shirk, 119 Pa. 108,
12 Atl. 806 (1888); Borrough v. Foster, 6 R. I. 534 (1860); Brownell v.
Brownell, 10 R. I. 509 (1873); Bells v. Gillespie, 5 Rand 273 (Va. 1827);
Broaddus v. Turner, 5 Rand 308 (Va. 1827).
Is Gray v. Gray, 20 Ga. 804 (1856); Huxford v. Milligan, 50 Ind. 542
(1875); Nowlin v. Winfree, 8 Gratt. 346 (Va. 1852). Contra: Williams
v. Graves, 17 Ala. 62 (1849).; Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105, 113 (1860) ocmble;
Pinkharn v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226 (1876) sernble; Kimball v. Penhallow, 60
N. H. 448 (1881) semble; Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12 (N. Y. 1813);
Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273, 280 (1855) seinble; Moreland v. Majors, 1
Murph. 48 (N. C. 1805) semble; DeTreville v. Ellis, 1 Bailey Eq. 40 (S. C.
1827); Stevens v. Patterson, 1 Bailey Eq. 42 (S. C. 1829); Brown v. Hunt,
12 Heisk. 404 (Tenn. 1873).
79 Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500 (1809) semble; Hawley v. Northampton, 8 Mlass.
3 (1811); Hurlburt v. Emerson, 16 Mlass. 241 (1819); Nightingale v. Bur-
rell, 15 Pick. 104 (Mass. 1833); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 3 Cush. 472 (Mass.
1849); Farrar v. Christy, 24 Mo. 453 (1857); Osborne v. Shrieve, 3 Mas.
391 (C. C. D. R. I. 1824) ; Burfoot v. Burfoots, 2 Leigh. 119, 132 (Va. 1830)
semble; Paterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. 259, 279 (N. Y. 1833) semble; Chet-
wood v. Winston, 40 N. J. L. 337 (1878); Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437 (1885)
semble; Caulk v. Caulk, 3 Pennew. 528, 52 Atl. 340 (Del. 1902) somblo;
Scofield v. Litchfield, 116 Me. 440, 102 Atl. 240 (1917); McCarthy v.
Walsh, 123 Me. 157, 122 Atl. 406 (1923).
Contra: Beresford v. Elliott, 1 Des. Eq. 183 (S. C. 1790); Robeson v.
Cochran, 255 Ill. 355, 358, 99 N. E. 649 (1912) scmble; Morehouse v. Coth-
eal, 2 Zab. 430, 440 note (N. J. L. 1850); Daniel v. Thomson, 14 B. Mon.
663 (Ky. 1854) ; Smith v. Kimbell, 153 IlL. 368, 38 N. E. 1029 (1894).
80 Beresford v. Elliott, 1 Des. Eq. 183 (S. C. 1790); Dunn v. Bray, 1
Call 294 (Va. 1798); Atwell's Executors v. Barney, 1 Dud. 207 (Ga. 1831)
semble; Clapp v. Fogleman, 1 D. & B. Eq. 466 (N. C. 1836); Robards v.
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(3) If the gift over upon death without issue is expressed to
take effect "after his decease" or "at his death," the weight of
authority holds both as to land and personalty that the common
law presumption is rebutted.-'
It is to be regretted that all the American judges have not
been able to anticipate the legislatures in holding that our social
structure justifies a departure from the common law of England,
and a holding that in all these categories there is a presumption
of a definite failure of issue.
A number of American cases without sufficient reason confine
a gift over on death without issue to such death prior to that of
the testator who created the limitations. These decisions cut
across the authorities hitherto discussed without paying any at-
tention to them. Before analyzing this anomalous line of author-
ity, it is necessary to consider the English law.
(1) If there is an immediate gift to A absolutely and a gift
over "in case of his death," or "if he die," such gift over will only
be effective if A dies before the testator 2
(2) If there is a gift to X for life and then to A absolutely, a
gift over "in case of A's death," or "if he die," will take effect
only if A die prior to the vesting in possession of his interest.88
(3) If there is a gift to A absolutely with a gift over "if A die
without issue him surviving" (or unmarried, or without children,
etc.), the gift is not confined to the death of A before that of the
testator s-
(4) Likewise, if, in the preceding case, there be a prior life
estate to X, the gift over takes effect upon the death of A with-
out issue him surviving at any time, whether before or after
the death of the testator or of the life tenant.85
(5) If in the last two preceding cases there are gifts over, first,
"if A die without issue him surviving," and second, "if A die
with issue him surviving," all possibilities after A's death are
Jones, 4 Ired. L. 53 (N. C. 1843); Ladd v. Harvey, 21 N. H. 514 (1850);
Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 122 (1854) semble; Woodward v. 'Woodward, 1
Green 83 (N. J. Eq. 1863); Allender v. Sussan, 33 Md. 11 (1870).
61 Atwell't Executors v. Barney, Dud. 207 (Ga. 1831) (personalty); Sin-
nickson v. Snitcher, 2 Green 53 (N. J. L. 1833) (land); Downing v. Wher-
rin, 19 N. H. 9 (1848) (land); Whitford v. Armstrong, 9 R. I. 394 (1870);
Swinburne, Petitioner, 16 R. I. 208 (1888) (realty and personalty); Wilson
v. Wilson, 46 N. J. Eq. 323 (1890) (land); Parkhurst v. Harrower, 142
Pa. 432 (1891) (land) semble; Hall v. Brownlee, 164 Ind. 238, 72 N. E.
131 (1904) (personalty) ; Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500, 502 (1809) (land) sem-
ble. But see Tinsley v. Jones, 13 Gratt. 289, 293 (1856) (land).
82 THEOBALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 742.
83 Ibid. 744.
84 Ibid. 745.
85 Ibid. 746. The leading case is O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 H. L.
388 (1875).
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taken care of, and, therefore, the gifts over are construed to take
effect if A die before his interest vests in possession.' °
It is with reference to the situations described in paragraphs
3, 4, and 5 that there are a number of American decisions 87 the
conclusions of 'Aich are not only at variance with the correct
results in England indicated above, but which also confuse the
facts in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 with those in paragraphs 1 and 2.
The problem has frequently been presented in this country in
the case of a gift over simply upon A's "death without issue."
Suppose, for instance, the view is taken that in a gift over "on
A (the first taker) dying with issue," "dying without issue"
means dying without issue prior to the testator, the question
still remains to be decided whether, if A dies before the testator,
and leaves a child who dies childless before the testator, the con-
tingency has in fact happened. Yet many of our courts have
dealt with this situation as if it had no relation whatever to the
question as to whether the gift over was upon definite or in-
definite failure of issue in the sense discussed in the early part
of this article. Almost invariably no mention is made of this
aspect of the case.
ALABAMA
Prior to the enactment of Section 1302 of the Alabama Code of
1852, which construed a gift over on "failure of issue" as a gift
conditioned on such failure at the death of the first taker, the
phrase imported an indefinite failure of issue.8 If the gift over
was to some one described as "surviving," a definite failure was
meant.' 9 But a gift over without leaving issue, at least as to
land, did not, in and of itself, limit the generality of the phraseP
In Smith v. Smith, 1 there was a gift over on death without
children surviving the first takers, and the court held, upon the
authority of the Indiana and Pennsylvania decisions, that the
contingency was confined to the death of the testator. In Burle-
son v. Mays, 92 where the gift over was on death "without leav-
ing any lawful heir," the court held that "heir" meant "children"
8
6THEOBALD, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 748; KALES, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 532; Updegraff, Some Effects of the District Code Provions Dispensing
With Words of Inheritance (1914) 14 GEo. L. REv. 253-256.
87 See Note (1909) 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045.
gs Darden's v. Burns, 6 Ala. 363 (1844) (personalty); Simmons v. Au-
gustin, 3 Port. 69, 103 (Ala. 1836) (land) semble; McGraw v. Davenport,
6 Port. 319 (Ala. 1837) (personalty) scnible.
8s9 Williams v. Graves, 17 Ala. 62 (1849) (personalty).
go Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437 (1885) (land-involved the construction of a
will drawn in 1839).
91139 Ala. 406, 36 So. 619 (1903).
92 189 Ala. 107, 66 So. 36 (1914).
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or "issue," and it followed Smith v. Smith.93 If there is a life
estate preceding the gift cut short by the conditional gift over,
such condition is confined to the life of the life tenant.0'
CONNECTICUT
A few early Connecticut cases on estates tail by implication
from a gift over on failure of issue would seem to indicate that
the common law rule was to be followed, and a general failure of
issue was prima facie intended. But the significance of these
cases is greatly weakened by the extraordinary and unprece-
dented holding in Hudson v. Wadsworth 9 5 that an estate tail by
implication may arise although the gift over is on definite failure
of issue.96 And against the inference in favor of the common
law doctrine, a number of cases justify the conclusion that
"where the phrase 'dying without issue' is held not to refer par-
ticularly to death before the testator, the phrase will be held to
refer to the taker's own death, and not to an indefinite failure of
issue in the future." 97
In Holmes v. Williams," there was a devise of land to Williams
and his heirs on condition that he pay Holmes £200 when he
arrives at full age, but if Williams die without issue, then to
Holmes and six others. It was held that the gift over was on
Williams' death without issue prior to full age.9 In Morgan v.
Morgan,'°° where the gift over upon death without issue was to
the brothers of the first taker, and there was no condition that
they survive him, the court seemed to think that a personal pro-
vision for them was meant, and it therefore restricted the condi-
tion to a definite failure of issue. The attitude of the court, how-
ever, was against the general common law meaning.1°  And in
93 Cf. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 196 Ala. 224, 72 So. 81 (1916) aomble,
where almost all contingencies were provided for, but such fact was not
made the basis for the opinion.
A similar point was directly passed upon, with the same result, in Spira
v. Frankel, 210 Ala. 27, 97 So. 104 (1923), where there was a gift over If
the first taker "should die leaving no issue."
94 Cf. Boshell v. Boshell, 218 Ala. 320, 118 So. 553 (1928) (the condition
held, upon a special context, to be effective no matter when it occurred);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 Ala. 674, 95 So. 183 (1923) (the condition was
if he "die childless.")
95 8 Conn. 348 (1831).
OG See Turrill v. Northrop, 51 Conn. 33, 38 (1883) ; Mahoney v. Mahoney,
98 Conn. 525, 536, 120 Atl. 342, 347 (1923).
97 CLEAVELAND, HEWITr AND CLARK, op. cit. suprab note 71, at 529. The
writer has relied upon the full collection of cases and their accurate state-
ment in this work. Ibid. 528-529, and Supplement (1929) 203, 213.
98 1 Root 332 (Conn. 1791).
99 Accord: Williams v. Dickerson, 2 Root 191 (Conn. 1795) (land).
oo 5 Day 517 (Conn. 1813).
.01 Ibid. 521, 522.
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the following year the court rejected Chadock v. Cowley,'1 and
held that, where there was a devise of land after failure of issue
to "surviving brethren," a definite failure of issue was in-
tended.103 Later, Bullock v. Seymour -0 and Clarke v. Terry 05
settled the law in favor of the restricted construction.-
The first decision cited for fettering to the death of the testator
a gift over on such a condition is Phelps v. Robbins.107 But this
case turned entirely upon the special context of the will in ques-
tion.108 Of more significance is White v. White.103 In restricting
the generality of the phrase to the death of the testator, the
court relied upon gifts over upon the death of the first taker,110
which are not in point, and also upon the special context. There
were dicta to a similar effect in Phelps v. Phelps "I and in Stone
v. McEckron.112 Johnes v. Beers 1123 went upon a special context in
the will in question. The leading case, however, is Lawlor v.
Holohan.14 This seems to be a solid decision to the restrictive
effect, but, as it relies upon the cases above cited, which by no
means settle the law for Connecticut, its force is weakened. In-
deed, Chesebro v. Palmer,1 5 relying upon Turril v. Northrop,10
went the other way. Lawlor v. Holohan was accordingly doubted
in Butler v. Flint.17 Nevertheless it must now be considered
law."18
No case has been found in Connecticut where there is a gift
to A for life, and then to B and his heirs, but if B die without
lo2 Supra note 25.
203 Couch v. Gorham, 1 Conn. 36 (1814).
1(0 33 Conn. 289 (1866).
105 34 Conn. 176 (1867).
216 May this result not be due to the fact that Connecticut "jurisprudence
was affected by the English law, more because the Colonists had imbibed its
spirit where it was good and suited to their needs, than" because they
directly copied or considered as in force any particular portion of it?"
CLEAVELAND, E[w , ANiD CLARK, op. cit. supra note 71, at 921.
10740 Conn. 250 (1873).
108 Ibid. 270.
109 52 Conn. 518 (1885).
110 Ibid. 521.
11155 Conn. 359 (1887).
11257 Conn. 194 (1889).
11 57 Conn. 295 (1889).
114 70 Conn. 87 (1897).
115 68 Conn. 207 (1896).
116 51 Conn. 33 (1883).
117 91 Conn. 630, 101 Atl. 19 (1917).
.118 Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 41 Atl. 813 (1898); Hull v.
Holmes, 78 Conn. 362, 62 Atl. 708 (1905); Rudlein v. Rand, 88 Conn. 292,
91 Atl. 198 (1914); Hull v. Hull, 101 Conn. 481, 126 Atl. 699 (1924); Burn-
ham v. Burnham, 101 Conn. 529, 126 At. 704 (1924); see CLENANr,.%-D,
HEWITT AND CLARK, op. cit. supra note 71, at 528 and Supplement (1929)
203.
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issue, to C and his heirs, and where the question of fettering tle
condition to the death of A has been clearly involved. Probably
such an event would not be chosen by the court in preference to
the death of the testator.1"9
GEORGIA
The early Georgia cases interpreted "dying without issue" as
referring to an indefinite failure of issue.120 In Harris v. Smith,"'
it was stated that the court, on slight evidence, would find a
definite failure of issue. But the court not long after suggested
in a case which apparently involved real and personal property
that a gift over to persons "surviving" had no such effect.122
Nevertheless, if the gift over is "at the death" of the first taker,
a definite failure of issue was held to exist in Atwell v. Barney.12
And there is a dictum that a death on "not leaving issue" has the
same effect as to personalty.124 A statute similar to the New
York act restricted the generality of the earlier decisions to a
definite failure of issue.- 5
Cases on the question of whether the contingency of "dying
without issue" should be confined to the period of distribution
are in conflict. The weight of authority, however, seems to be
in favor of such restriction. The early case of Bailey v. Ross 120
favors the period of distribution, although the court relied on
the special context. And Sumpter v. Carter 12, confines the condi-
tion to the death of the life tenant. Starnes v. Sanders I20 is to
the same effect. Moore v. Cook 1 suggests that, where there is
no life estate, words of survivorship are to be referred to the
death of the testator, unless the contrary appears. Two other
cases tend to hold that the condition refers to the death of the
first taker at any time.230  No distinction seems to be taken be-
tween real and personal property.
,11 See Scanlin v. Peterson, 105 Conn. 308, 313-314, 135 Atl. 394, 397
(1926); Keeley v. Imindok, 105 Conn. 742, 136 Atl. 560 (1927); cf. Meri-
den Trust Co. v. Squire, 92 Conn. 440, 103 At]. 269 (1918) (the court
confined the gift over to the first taker's death before twenty-one).
120 Wiley v. Smith, 3 Ga. 551 (1847) ; Gray v. Gray, 20 Ga. 804 (1856);
Brown v. Weaver, 28 Ga. 377 (1859); Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707, 36
S. E. 409 (1900) (will probated in 1847).
12116 Ga. 545 (1855).
122 Brown v. Weaver, supra note 120.
12 3 Dud. 207 (Ga. 1831).
124 Roberts v. West, 15 Ga. 122 (1854).
125 Ga. Acts 1853-54, p. 72, No. 62.
126 66 Ga. 354 (1881).
127 115 Ga. 893, 42 S. E. 324 (1902).
128 151 Ga. 632, 107 S. E. 863 (1921).
129 153 Ga. 840, 113 S. E. 526 (1922).
130 Kinard v. Hale, 128 Ga. 485, 57 S. E. 761 (1007); Curles v. Wade,
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ILLINOIS
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that, if there was a
provision that the first taker die "without leaving issue," a def-
inite failure of issue was meint 13 So also in the case of real es-
tate if the gift over was to the survivor "of two devisees." 213
Apart from interests subject to an estate tail, the court has never
held a future interest limited to take effect upon an indefinite
failure of issue. In Lunt v. Lunt 133 and in Strain v. Sweeny 134 it
has strained language to find a definite failure of issue. There
are two dicta to the effect that the rule of the English Wills Act
is in force.235 In two recent cases 130 the court appears to have
held that "die without issue" might be treated as meaning pri-
marily "die without ever having had issue," even where the first
taker had a fee and there was no independent gift to the issue or
children of the first taker.2
37
Later Illinois cases, where there have been gifts over upon
"death without issue" or "death without children," must now be
considered from the point of view as to whether the contingency
was on the death of the testator or preceding the death of the
life tenant. Mr. Kales has considered these conditions, and we
adopt his conclusion."83 Where the limitations are by will to A,
simply with a gift or gifts over on A's death and one or more
collateral contingencies, Mr. Kales says:
"If it be determined that A takes only a life estate, then
clearly 'die' refers to the death of the life tenant whenever that
may occur. King v. King, 215 Ill. 100 (1905); Branson v.
Bailey, 246 Ill. 490 (1910). Even where it is determined that A
takes a fee or an absolute interest the settled rule now is that
151 Ga. 142, 106 S. E. 1 (1920) ; cf. Hill v. Terrell, 123 Ga. 49, 51 S. E. 81
(1905).
131 Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368, 38 N. E. 1029 (1894); Hinricksen v.
Hinricksen, 172 Ill. 462, 50 N. E. 135 (1898); Mletzen v. Schopp, 202 fI.
275, 67" N. E. 36 (1903); Robeson v. Cochran, 255 Ill. 355, 99 N. E. 649
(1912) ; Morris v. Phillips, 287 Ill. 633, 122 N. E. 831 (1919) ; see KALEs,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 545, n. 65.
132 Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421 (1867); Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill.
645, 21 N. E. 191 (1889); Hinricksen v. Hinricksen, supra note 131; Arnold
v. Alden, 173 Ill. 229, 50 N. E. 704 (1898) ; cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 98 Ill.
564 (1881) ; Silva v. Hopkinson, 158 Ill. 386, 41 N. E. 1013 (1895).
133108 Ill. 307 (1891).
134163 11. 603, 45 N. E. 201 (1896).
133 Summers v. Smith, supra note 132, at 650-651, 21 N. E. at 192; Smith
v. Kimbell, supra note 131, at 376, 38 N. E. at 1031.
136 Stafford v. Read, 244 Ill. 138, 91 N. E. 91 (1910); Kendall v. Taylor,
245 II. 617, 91 N. E. 644 (1910).
:1, Cf. Field v. Peoples, 180 Ill. 376, 54 N. E. 304 (1890) ; Morris v. Phil-
lips, supra note 131, at 640, 122 N. E. at 834.
138 KALES, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 531-534.
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prima facie 'death' refers to death at any time either before or
after the testator's death. Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481
(1917) ; Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Ill. 254 (1916) ; Wilson v. Wil-
son, 261 Il1. 174 (1913); Brenock v. Brenock, 230 Ill. 519
(1907) ; Crocker v. Van Vlissinger, 230 Ill. 225 (1907) ; Carpen-
ter v. Sangamon Trust Co., 229 Ill. 486 (1907) ; Fifer v. Allen,
228 Ill. 507 (1907); Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 Ill. 239 (1903);
Thomas v. Miller, 161 Ill. 60 (1896); Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill.
368 (1894) ; Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645 (1889)." 109
Clark v. Leavitt 140 is to the same effect.
Where there is a gift to X for life, and then to Y absolutely,
with a gift over on Y's death and one or more collateral con-
tingencies, the effect is doubtful. In Lachenmyer 'v. Gehlbach,"
where the limitation was to Y and the gifts exhausted all possi-
bilities, the court restricted the contingencies to the death of the
life tenant.142 Where there was a single gift over, death at any
time was meant.143 But Sheley v. Sheley 1" misunderstood Lach-
enmyer v. Gehbach and held that, where there was only one
contingency, the result should be the same as in that case. Sheley
v. Sheley seems to have been approved in Ames 'v. Smith; 1"
Fulwiler v. McClwn; I' Morris v. Phillips; 147 and Risser v.
Ayres; 1- and there was a dictum to the same effect in Drager
v. McIntosh149
INDIANA
In Indiana, until a comparatively recent date, the old com-
mon law was strictly adhered to. Indeed, the court went a little
beyond the English judges, for an indefinite failure of issue vwao
held to be meant, with respect to real and personal property,
even where the expression "death without issue" was coupled
with a gift over to what was substantially "survivors" of living
persons.50 But if the gift over was expressed to be after the
death of the first taker, then a definite failure of issue was held
139 Ibid. § 531.
140 330 Ill. 350. 161 N. E. 751 (1928).
141266 Ill. 11, 107 N. E. 202 (1914).
142 Welch v. Crowe, 278 Ill. 244, 115 N. E. 859 (1917) and Kleinhaus v.
Kleinhaus, 253 Ill. 620, 97 N. E. 1077 (1912) seem inconsistent with this
holding.
'4s Garvin v. Carroll, 276 Ill. 478, 114 N. E. 927 (1917).
1- 272 Ill. 95, 111 N. E. 59 (1916).
141 284 Ill. 63, 119 N. E. 969 (1918).
146 285 Ill. 174, 120 N. E. 458 (1918).
1147 Supra note 131.
148 306 Ill. 293, 137 N. E. 851 (1923).
149 316 Ill. 460, 466, 147 N. E. 433, 436 (1925).
150 Huxford v. Milligan, 50 Md. 542 (1875).
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to be intended, even though the gift over was not to "sur-
vivors." 5'
Before long, however, a gift over on death without issue was
interpreted in Wright v. Charley 152 as such death before the
testator. This change seems to have been based upon New York
and Pennsylvania cases holding that conditional gifts over upon
the death of the first taker were confined to such death before
the testator, and upon a failure to consider the distinctions taken
in O'Mahoney v. Burdett.2 ' But Wright -v. Charley has been fol-
lowed.15 Indeed, the Indiana court confines the death without
issue to the life of the testator even though there is a life estate
prior to the gift of the ancestor.'5 Had not Indiana followed
New York and Pennsylvania in this broad application of the
restricted construction, it would seem that the law of Indiana
would have been that an indefinite failure of issue at any time
was meant.1 s
IOWA
In Collins v. Collins,"" the Iowa court held that, where there
was a devise in fee, the devisee to take on the death of the testa-
tor, coupled with a gift over in case the donee died without issue,
the words referred to such death during the lifetime of the tes-
tator, and that if the devisee survived, he should take an
absolute estate in fee simple, and that this rule applied to real
and personal property.15s This rule was approved in Tarbell v.
Smith 19 and in Blain v. Dean."c" In Tarbell v. Smith one of the
reasons given was that the gift over was void for repugnancy
under the rule of Meyer v. Weiler.10' In both these cases the gift
151 Hall v. Brownlee, 164 Ind. 238, 72 N. E. 131 (1905).
152 129 Ind. 257, 28 N. E. 706 (1891).
-5 Supra note 85; cf, Harris v. Carpenter, 109 Ind. 540, 10 N. E. 422
(1887); Heilman v. Heilman, 129 Ind. 59, 28 N. E. 310 (1891).
54 Antioch College v. Branson, 145 Ind. 312, 44 N. E. 314 (1896) ; Teal
v. Richardson, 160 Ind. 119, 66 N. E. 435 (1903); Clark v. Thieme, 181
Ind. 163, 103 N. E. 1068 (1914); Quilliam v. Union Trust Co., 194 Ind.
521, 142 N. E. 214 (1924); cf. Morgan v. Robbins, 152 Ind. 362, 53 N.
E. 283 (1899); First Nat. Bank v. DePauw, 86 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 7th,
1898); Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248, 42 N. E. 623 (1896).
255 Borgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N. E. 92 (1893); cf. Moores v.
Hare, 144 Ind. 573, 43 N. E. 870 (1896) ; Hoover v. Hoover, 116 Ind. 498,
19 N. E. 468 (1889).
156 See Quilliam v. Union Trust Co., supra note 154, at 534, 142 N. E.
at 218.
'1- 116 Iowa 703, 88 N. W. 1097 (1902).
158 The court cited Fowler v. Duhme, supra note 154.
-9 125 Iowa 388, 101 N. AN. 118 (1904).
160 160 Iowa 708, 142 N. W. 418 (1913).
16, 121 Iowa 51, 95 N. W. 254 (1903).
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over was of only such real and personal property as was left by
the prior devisee. Talbot v. Snodgrass,1 2 relying upon Meyer v.
Weiler, decided that a gift over was void for repugnancy. In
Tarbell v. Smith, on the other hand, the gift over was not of
what was left, and, therefore, the decision is of no value.
Tarbell v. Smith contained a dictum that the contingency of
"dying without issue" should be confined to the testator's death
even though there was a preceding life estate. But in Dowd v.
Scally ,63 the court intimated that the condition would be allowed
to operate when it occurred after the death of the testator and
before the life tenant. In that case all contingencies after the
death of the life tenant were provided for.' 6'
KENTUCKY
Kentucky is one of the few jurisdictions which abandoned the
common law presumption and adopted, about the middle of the
nineteenth century, a presumption of definite failure of issue both
as to real and personal property. 65 This may have been due to
the hostility shown in Kentucky to the English common law. 10
In Harvey v. Bell,6" the testator devised his property in trust
to his four grandchildren. He further provided that if any of
them should "die without issue of his or her body living, the
property devised to the one so dying should be equally divided
between the remaining ones or their issue." A question arose as
to the title to some of the land, which in turn depended upon the
construction of the above quoted expression in the will. The
court held that death without issue at any time was meant and
not such death before the testator. It laid down four rules:
"1st. Where an estate is devised to one for life, with re-
mainder to another, and, if the remainderman die without chil-
dren or issue, then to a third person, the rule is that the words
'dying without children or issue' are restricted to the death of
the remainderman before the termination of the particular estate.
"2d. Where property is devised to one or more infants, and
is to be held by their trustees or guardians until they are twenty-
one years old, and then be turned over to them, or divided be-
162 124 Iowa 681, 100 N. W. 500 (1904).
183 184 N. W. 340 (Iowa 1921).
24 Cf. Atchison v. Francis, 182 Iowa 37, 165 N. W. 587 (1917) ; Caslavka
v. Caslavka, 194 Iowa 52, 188 N. W. 4 (1922) ; In re Clifton's Estate, 205
Iowa 913, 218 N. W. 926 (1928).
. 165 Black v. Cartmell, 10 B. Mon. 188 (Ky. 1849) semble; Northcut v.
Whipp, 12 B. Mon. 65 (Ky. 1851); Moore v. Moore, 12 B. Mon. 651 (Ky.
1851).
20 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 245n.
See Ky. Rsv. STAT. (1852) c. 80, § 9, which enacts this presumption as to
real estate.
167 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W. 671 (1904).
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tween them, with the proviso that, if they die without issue, it
shall go to the survivors, or, if all die, to a third person, it has
been held that the limitation as to dying without issue is to be
limited to a death in infancy before the period of distribution.
"3d. Wher6, by, the will, the devise is to a class, and the period
of division is postponed, even where the devisees are not infants,
it has been held that the limitation as to dying without issue must
be confined to a death without issue before the period of division
fixed by the will.
"4th. On the other hand, where there is no intervening estate,
and no other period to which the words 'dying without issue'
can be reasonably referred, they are held, in the absence of
something in the will evidencing a contrary intent, to create a
defeasible fee which is defeated by the death of the devisee at
any time without issue then living." "C
The first rule had its origin in Birnzcy v. Richardson,cO where
there was a bequest of real and personal property to the testator's
wife during widowhood, and if she married the whole estate was
to be equally divided among the testator's children, and if any
of the children "should die without a lawful heir begotten of their
body, then his or her part of the estate would be equally divided
among my surviving children." In an action for some of the per-
sonal property the construction of the will was drawn in ques-
tion. The court held that the testator intended a dying without
issue prior to the wife's marriage. It has been pointed out that
this result is entirely sound.170 The Kentucky case was based on
the earlier English case of Galland v. Lecurd,271 where the facts
were substantially the same. Both cases may well stand upon the
intention of the testator disclosed upon the face of the will to
confine the contingency to the period of division, which is evi-
denced by his direction to divide the corpus.172 Indeed it has been
made clear in England that in a gift to A for life and then to B,
and if B dies without issue, over, the-gift over will take effect
upon the death of B at any time without issue./T3 Rule 1 there-
fore, is based upon a misapprehension, and indeed is in principle
inconsistent with the 4th rule mentioned therein, where, in the
absence of a life estate, there is no fettering condition to the
period of division. 74 But the rules in Harvey v. Bcli are appar-
ently still law in Kentucky.'
16 Ibd 521-524, 81 S. W. at 674-675.
269 5 Dana 424 (Ky. 1837).
170 Note (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 512, 514.
171 Swans. 161 (1818).
172 Accord: Boynton v. Boynton, 165 N. E. 489 (Blass. 1929).
173 O'Mahoney v. Burdett, supra note 85; THEOBALD, op. Cit. supra note
3, at 486.
'- See O'Mahoney v. Burdett, suprz note 85; THEOBALD, op. Cit. supra
note 3, at'486. The first rule has been ably criticized in Note (1924) 24
COL. L. REv. 512, 514-518.
175 1st RUie: Ferguson v. Thomasson, 87 Ky. 519, 9 S. W. 714 (1888);
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MARYLAND
The doctrine of the Maryland cases involving wills and deeds
prior to 1862 was as strict, if not stricter, than the common law.
The phrase "dying without issue" was interpreted to mean an
indefinite failure of issue."16 If tlhe gift over is to "survivors" of
living persons, then Chadock v. Cowley 171 is followed as to land. 1'"
Although no decision is directly in point there seems to be a dis-
position to follow Roe v. Jeffrey.179
By Acts of 1862, c. 161, the expression "dying without issue"
in a will was restricted to a definite failure of issue; and in
Laws of 1866, c. 236, the same provision was extended to gifts
inter vivos.
Forsythe v. Lansing, 109 Ky. 518, 69 S. W. 854 (1900); Bradshaw v. Vil-
liams, 140 Ky. 160, 130 S: W. 985 (1910); Jewell v. White, 166 Ky. 325,
179 S. W. 212 (1915) ; White v. White, 168 Ky. 752, 182 S. W. 942 (1916)
demble; Baker v. Thomas, 172 Ky. 334, 189 S. W. 215 (1916); Bonner v.
Wedekind, 193 Ky. 743, 237 S. W. 394 (1922) ; Ensminger v. Grimes, 201 Ky.
494, 257 S. W. 19 (1923) ; Linton v. Hail, 201 Ky. 698, 702, 258 S. W. 111
(1924) semble; Wilson v. Morrill, 205 Ky. 257, 265 S. W. 774 (1924); Mc-
Williams v. Havely, 214 Ky. 320, 283 S. W. 103 (1926); Rankin v. Rankin,
227 Ky. 169, 12 S. W. (2d) 319 (1928).
2d Rule: Jones v. Moore, 96 Ky. 273, 28 S. W. 659 (1894); Linton v.
Hail, 201 Ky. 698-702, 258 S. W. 111 (1924) emble; Howard v. Howard,
212 Ky. 847, 280 S. W. 156 (1926).
3d Rule: Linton v. Hail, 201 Ky. 698-702, 258 S. W. 111 (1924) osmble.
4th Rule: The court said, by way of dictum, that this rule only applied
to a case of real property, and that if the subject matter were personal,
the condition would be confined to the case of the testator. Harvey v. Bell,
supra note 167, at 526. On the whole this distinction seems to have been
preserved in the rest of the cases. Calloway v. Calloway, 171 Ky. 366,
188 S. W. 410 (1916) (real and personal property confined to death of
testator); Prewitt v. Prewitt, 178 Ky. 346, 198 S. W. 924 (1917) (real
and personal property confingd to death of testator); Ruhe v. Lisle, .00
Ky. 520, 255 S. W. 133 (1923) (realty confined to death of testator).
In Atkinson v. Kern, 210 Ky. 824, 276 S. W. 977 (1925) which was a
case of real property, the court disapproved the cases just cited and fol-
lowed the 4th rule in Harvey v. Bell. Other cases involving land approving
the 4th rule are: Simpson v. Adams, 127 Ky. 790, 106 S. W. 819 (1908);
Craig v. Williams, 179 Ky. 329, 200 S. W. 481 (1918); Linton v. Hail, 201
Ky. 698-702, 258 S. W. 111 (1924) aemble; Ireland v. Cooper, 211 Ky. 823,
277 S. W. 483 (1925); Laughlin v. Neeley, 223 Ky. 656, 4 S. W. (2d) 690
(1928). But in spite of the fact that Calloway v. Calloway, supra, was
disapproved, it would seem that the distinction made In Harvey v. Bell
between real and personal property still persists. See Ireland v. Cooper,
211 Ky. 323, 326, 277 S. W. 483, 484 (1925).
a1- Laidler v. Young, 2 H. & J. 69 (Md. 1807) ; Tongue's Lessee v. Nut-
well, 13 Md. 415 (1858); Comegys v. Jones, 65 Md. 317, 4 AtI. 567 (1886).
177 Supra note 25.
178 Newton v. Griffith, 1 Har. & G. 111 (Md. 1827); Hoxton v. Archer,
3 G. & J. 199 (Md. 1831). &
79 Supra note 26. See Newton v. Griffith, supra note 178, at 123, 124;
Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418, 17 AtI. 329 (1889).
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In Fdirfax v. Brown,0 a gift over on failure of issue living at
death of first taker was confined to such death before the termin-
ation of the preceding estate to a life tenant. It should be noticed,
however, that the gift over exhausted all the possibilities. In
other words, there was a gift to issue, if there was issue, and a
gift over if there was no issue left at the death of the first taker.
In Hutchins v. Pearce,lsl the condition was held to apply to the
death of the first taker at any time, and Fairfax v. Rrouw was
said to go upon a special context. In Bentz v. Maryland Bible
S6ciety 182 and in Gerting v. Wells 185 the gift was confined to the
period of distribution, which was at the end of a period of years
from the death of the testator. These two cases seem to be based
upon Hammett v. Hammett." 4 In that case there was a devise
of real and personal property to the widow during life or mar-
riage, then a gift to the children and a further bequest upon the
death of the children. The court held that the condition was
confined to the period of the life estate. The gift, however, was
"on death" and not "on death without issue." In Lumpkin V.
Lumpkin,295 there was a gift to the testator's children to take
effect at his death, but in case any of them died without leaving
lawful issue, then to the testator's wife and his surviving chil-
dren. The arguments by counsel were full and able. The court
held that the condition was confined to the testator's death and
that if any child survived the testator that child took absolutely.
That was said to be the law in Maryland. 80  It is submitted,
however, that the case is not of great value in that it relied upon
Hammett v. Hammett 1 87 and upon New York decisions. In Duer-
ing v. Brill,,- the same result was reached on the authority of
Lumpkin v. Lumpkin.19 But in Duering v. Brill the gift ex-
hausted all possibilities. Godwin v. Kemp 20 0 went upon a special
context of the will in question.
Where a life estate precedes the devise, which is divested upon
the death of the taker without issue, such condition in Maryland
seems to be confined to the duration of the lives of the testator
and the life tenant."'
180 60 Md. 50 (1882).
180 Md. 434, 31 Atl. 501 (1895).
18286 Md. 102, 37 Atl. 708 (1897).
183 100 Md. 93, 59 Atl. 177 (1904).
14 43 Md. 307 (1875).
185 108 Md. 470, 70 Atl. 238 (1908).
1-0 Ibid. 498-499, 70 Atl. at 244.
L87 Supra note 184.
188 127 Md. 104, 96 Atl. 269 (1915).
189 Supra note 185.
190 129 Md. 159, 98 Atl. 495 (1916).
:L- Booth v. Eberly, 124 Md. 22, 91 Atl. 767 (1914).
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MISSOURI
Prior to 1845,1912 a gift over on failure of issue meant an indef-
inite failure of descendants.19 3 An early dictum indicates that
it is immaterial that the gift over is expressed to some one "sur-
viving" the first taker.1'' But later dicta are the other way.105
In Yocum v. Siler,196 land was devised to Y with a gift over
if he died ".without issue." Y survived the testator and had legal
issue living at his death. It was held that Y took absolutely. It
was assumed in the opinion that the gift over would have been
effective irrespective of when the condition happened. But it
was not necessary to the decision to pass upon this question." '
Gannon v. Pauk 19 has a dictum to the same effect. Naylor V.
Godman; 199 Union Trust Co. v. Curby; 200 and Hartnett v.
Langan 2 0 go upon special language in the will showing a period
of division to which death without issue should be referred.20
2
The earliest case confining death without issue to the death of
the testator is Henderson v. Calhoun203 which relies solely on
cases holding a presumption in general of early vesting of all
kinds of future interests. Huntington Real Estate Co. v. Mega-
ree 204 involved a gift over on death with children, which was
held upon the authority of Henderson v. Calhoun to become ab-
solute upon the testator's death. The leading case is Owens v.
Men and Millions Movement,2- where a gift over upon death
"without leaving any issue" was confined to such death before
the testator. No Missouri cases were relied upon, but the court
cited and followed decisions from Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ken-
tucky, Iowa, Maryland, Indiana and New York. The court cited
the Statute of 1845 2- which presumed a definite failure of issue,
and held it inapplicable.20 7 This case was followed in Ewart v.
192 Mo. REV. STAT. (1845) c. 32, § 6 presumed a definite failure of issue.
193 Vaughn v. Guy, 17 Mo. 429 (1853) ; Farrar v. Christy's, 24 Mo. 453
(1857); Chism's v. Williams, 29 Mo. 288 (1860); see Hudson, Estatco Tail
in Missouri (1915) 1 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SE. no. 1, p. 9.
194 Farrar v. Christy's, supra note 193.
195 Gannon v. Albright, 183 Mo. 238, 81 S. W. 1162 (1904) (land);
Gannon v. Pauk, 200 Mo. 75, 98 S. W. 471 (1906).
196 160 Mo. 281, 61 S. W. 208 (1901).
297 Cf. Yocum v. Parker, 134 Fed. 205 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).
198 Supra note 195.
199 109 Mo. 543, 19 S. W. 56 (1891).
200 255 Mo. 393, 164 S. W. 485 (1914).
201 282 Mo. 471, 222 S. W. 403 (1920).
21,2 See also Welch v. Wagner, 232 S. W. 146 (Mo. 1921).
203 183 S. W. 584 (Mo. 1916).
204 280 Mo. 41, 217 S. W. 301 (1919).
205 296 Mo. 110, 246 S. W. 172 (1922).
206 Supra, note 192.
207 Owens v. Men and Millions Movement, supra note 205, at 121, 246 S.
W. at 175.
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Dalby,2 '8 where it was also suggested, without being decided, that,
if there had been a preceding life estate, the contingency would
have been fettered to a happening before the death of the life
tenant.209 The court relied for its decision not only upon Owens
v. Men and Millions Movement, but also upon Northeutt v. Mc-
Allister, 2 1 where the gift over was on death only, upon Huntig-
ton Real Estate Co. v. Megarce,21" and upon Henderson v. Cal-
houz.21 It thought furthermore that there was a suggestion in
Naylor v. God2nan 213 in the same direction.
NEW JERSEY
In an early case in 1795, an estate tail was said to be created
by a devise to the testator's three sons and their heirs with the
proviso that "if either of my sons above named die without issue
the premises given to him or them dying as aforesaid, shall go to
him or them that survive." 214 Later cases, however, have clearly
held that in a devise of land a gift over to persons described as
"surviving" results in a definite failure of issue.21 It was like-
wise held, with regard to personalty and realty, that the word
"living" added to a gift over upon death without issue had the
same effect.216 And in the case of land it was also held that a
definite failure was meant by the phrase "if he shall die without
issue, that then at his decease." 217
In 1851 by statute New Jersey confined the presumption to a
definite failure of issue.218 Meanwhile a long list of decisions was
forming which restricted such a condition to the death of the
testator 2 1 or to the death of the life tenant.
2 2
D
208 319 Mo. 108, 5 S. W. (2d) 428 .(1928).
209 Ibid. 120, 5 S. W. (2d) at 432.
220 297 Mo. 475, 249 S. W. 398 (1922).
211 Supra note 204.
212 Supra note 203.
213 109 Mo. 543, 551, 19 S. W. 56, 58 (1892).
214 Secquil v. Moore, 1 Coxe 386 (N. J. L. 1795).
215 Van Middlesworth v. Schenk, 3 Halst. 29 (N. J. L. 1824); Wardell v.
Allaire, 1 Spenc. 6 (N. J. L. 1842); Seddel v. Wills, 1 Spenc. 223 (N. J. L.
1843); Howell v. Howell, 1 Spene. 411 (N. J. L. 1845); Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 5 Dutch. 185 (N. J. L. 1861); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 1 McCart 23
(N. J. Eq. 1861).
21 Wallington v. Taylor, Sax. 314 (N. J. Eq. 1831) (land); Woodward
v. Woodward, 1 Green Ch. 83 (N. J. Eq. 1863) (personalty).
217 Sinnickson v. Snitcher, 2 Green 53, 59 (N. J. L. 1833) (land).
218 N. J. Laws 1851, March 12, p. 218.
219 Yawger v. Yawger, 37 N. J. Eq. 216 (1883); Denise v. Denise, 37
N. J. Eq. 163 (1883); Barrell v. Barrell, 38 N. J. Eq. 60, 39 N. J. Eq. 603
(1884); Baldwin v. Taylor, 37 N. J. Eq. 78, 38 N. J. Eq. 637 (1884)
semble; Burdge v. Walling, 45 N. J. Eq. 10, 16 Ati. 51 (1888); Snyder
v. Taylor, 88 N. J. Eq. 513, 103 At. 396 (1918); cf. Wilson v. Wilson, 46
N. J. Eq. 321, 19 Atl. 132 (1890); Steinhart v. Wolf, 95 N. J. Eq. 132,
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In Wurts v. Page,2 21 there was a devise of shares to daughters
to be paid on marriage, and to some sons at 21 and to the other
sons at 22, and "in case of the decease of any of my said children
without issue," then over. The court held that as to the daughters
there was a gift over at their death, and as to the sons a gift over
before the shares were payable.
In Pennington v. Van Houten,-2 the testator devised all of his
real and personal estate to his son, but ordered his executors to
put the proceeds at interest and support the son until he attained
21; "but if my son Abraham should die having no children, then"
over. The court held that the contingency upon which the gift
over was limited was confined to the son's death under 21.
In Patterson v. Madden,223 there was a gift of land to the tes.
tator's sons. He provided, however, that none of the land should
be sold during the .life of his wife. He further provided that if
any of his sons "should die without leaving issue and leaving a
widow," then over. The court held that Pennington v'. Van Hou-
ten governed and that the condition upon which the gift over was
limited was confined to the death of the sons before the testator's
wife. It laid down two rules:
"Fi-st. If land be devised to A in fee and a subsequent clause
in the will limits such land over to designated persons in case A
dies without issue, and A so dies, and the substituted devisees are
in esse at his death, and there is no other event expressed in the
will to which the limitation over can fairly be referred, then A
takes a vested fee which becomes divested at his death and vests
in those to whom the estate is limited over.
"Second. Where there is an event indicated in the will other
than the death of the devisee to which the limitation over is ref-
erable (for instance, the distrib.ution of the testator's estate or
thepostponement of the enjoyment of the property devised until
the devisee reaches the age of twenty-one or until the exhaustion
of a prior life estate), such limitation over will be construed to
122 At. 886 (1923). But see Hampton v. Newkirk, 93 N. J. Eq. 270, 115
Atl. 656 (1921); Patterson v. Madden, 54 N. J. Eq. 714, 723, 36 Atl. 273
(1896); Ackerman v. Vreeland, supra note 215, at 24; Wurts v. Page, 19
N. J. Eq. 365 (1869).
220 Wurts v. Page; Yawger v. Yawger, both supra note 219; Williamson
v. Chamberlain, 10 N. J. Eq. 373 (1855); McDowell v. Stiger, 58 N. J.
Eq. 125, 42 Atl. 575 (1899); Shimer v. Shimer, 50 N. J. Eq. 300, 24 Atl.
385 (1892); Keepers v. Fidelity Co., 56 N. J. L. 302, 28 Atl. 585 (1894);
Patterson v. Madden, supra note 219; Dilts v. Clayhaunce, 70 N. J. Eq.
10, 62 Atl. 672 (1906); Michael v. Minchin, 90 N. J. L. 603, 101 At]. 283
(1917) semble; Freund v. Freund, 91 N. J. Eq. 80, 110 Atl. 449 (1919);
Davis v. Scharf, 99 N. J. Eq. 88, 133 Atl. 197 (1926); Schreve v. Wilkins,
82 N. J. Eq. 18, 87 At]. 642 (1913) (following what is said to be the Orst
rule in Patterson v. Madden).
221 Supra note 219.
222 4 Halst. Ch. 745 (N. J. Eq. 1852).
223 Supra note 220.
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refer to the happening of such event or to the death of the de-
visee, according as the court may determine from the context of
the will and the other provisions thereof that the limitation clause
is set in apposition to the event specified or is connected with the
devise itself." 221,
The court found the first rule followed in Ackerman v. Vree-
land,225 and in the decision on one of the devises in lurts v.
Page,2- and the second rule followed in Wiiiamsron v. Chamber-
lain,227 and in the decision on another of the devises in Wurts v.
Page.
It is to be noticed that the second rule above quoted does not
indicate any prima facie presumption as to whether the condi-
tion is to be confined to the death of the life tenant or the death
of the devisee at any time. In three later cases it is indicated
that the former presumption is to be adopted and that in the
absence of a special context the condition is confined to the death
of the life tenant.22 And a similar result has been reached where
there is a period of distribution in the future.2 20" But on the other
hand, such condition has been interpreted as operating on the
death of the first taker at any time, where there was only a slight
special context to justify the result.
2 0
The first rule in Patterson v. Madden is affirmed in Snyder v.
Taylor.231 There seems to be no distinction made by the courts
between real and personal property in all these cases.
NEW YORK
The early New York decisions on definite and indefinite failure
of issue are discussed above in connection with the New York
legislation.
32
The law of New York on confining gifts over on failure of issue
to the death of the testator or of a life tenant has been exhaus-
tively reviewed elsewhere by Professor Updegraff, - and will
therefore not be considered here.
224 Ibid. 723.
225 Supra. note 215.
226 Supra note 219.
227 Supra note 220.
228 Michael v. Minchin, supra note 220; Freund v. Freund, 91 N. J. Eq.
80, 110 Atl. 449 (1919); Davis v. Scharf, 99 N. J. Eq. 88, 133 Atl. 197
(1926).
229 McDowell v. Stiger, 58 N. J. Eq. 125, 42 AtI. 575 (1899); Keepers
v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 56 N. J. L. 302, 28 Atl. 585 (1894).
2so Hampton v. Newkirk, 93 N. J. Eq. 270, 115 Atl. 656 (1921); Am-
bruster v. "Owm Your Own Home" Ass'n, 97 N. J. Eq. 69, 127 At!. 167
(1925).
23188 N. J. Eq. 513, 103 Atl. 396 (1918).
232 Supra at 338-339.
233 Updegraff, op. cit. supra note 86, at 249-256.
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NORTH CAROLINA
The cases in North Carolina on wills and conveyances taking
effect prior to the Act of 1827-28 show that whether the subject
matter was real or personal property the common law rule of
indefinite failure of issue was followed.2
34
In Hilliard v. Kearney,235 the case turned upon the construc-
tion of a will made in 1775 by which negroes were bequeathed
to the testator's wife for life and after her death to be equally
divided "among my five daughters, Mary, Sarah, Elizabeth, Dru-
cilla and Nancy, and if either of them die without an heir, her
part to be equally divided among her other sisters." The testa-
tor's wife and five daughters survived him. His wife died, then
Mary died, and the negroes were divided between the four sur-
viving daughters. Afterwards Sarah and Nancy died, leaving
children. Then Elizabeth died without a child. The court, rely-
ing upon English cases, decided that as Elizabeth had survived
the testator and the life tenant, her share had become absolute.
It pointed out that where there was no prior gift to that which
was to go over upon death without issue the contingency was to
be confined to the life of the testator; but, "if there be an inter-
mediate period between the death of the testator and the death
of the legatee, at which the estate may fairly be considered ab-
solute," that time will be adopted. In this case the children had
survived both the testator and the life tenant, and it was un-
necessary to decide as to whether the condition should be con-
fined to the death of the testator or the death of the life tenant.
But the court went on to discuss this question and found suffi-
cient evidence upon the face of the will to fetter'the condition
to the period before the testator's death.
This doctrine in North Carolina, as elsewhere, seems an un-
conscious departure from the prior cases. Only a few years be-
fore, in Garland v. Watt,236 the court had taken such a condition
generally. Nevertheless, where there was no life estate or period
of division otherwise fixed, the rule of Hilliard v. Kearney was
followed. 237 Where the gift to the first taker was postponed until
234 Realty: Brown v. Brown, 3 Ired. L. 134 (N. C. 1842); Brantley v.
Whitaker, 5 Ired. L. 225 (N. C. 1844); Cox v. Marks, 5 Ired. L. 361 (N.
C. 1845); Hollowell ' . Kornegay, 7 Ired. L. 261 (N. C. 1847); Weatherly
v. Armfield, 8 Ired. L. 25 (N. C. 1847).
Personalty: Bryson v. Davidson, 1 Murph. 143 (N. C. 1806); Davidson
v. Davidson, 1 Hawks. 163 (N. C. 1820); Rice v. Satterwhite, 1 D. & B. Eq.
69 (N. C. 1835); Ferrand v. Howard, 3 Ired. Eq. 381 (N. C. 1844); Porter
v. Ross, 2 Jon. Eq. 196 (N. C. 1855).
235 Busb. Eq. 221 (N. C. 1853).
236 4 Ired. L. 287 (N. C. 1844).
237 Vass v. Freeman, 3 Jon. Eq. 221 (N. C. 1857) ; Garrison v. Eborn, 3
Jon. Eq. 228 (N. C. 1857); Jenkins v. Hall, 4 Jon. Eq.'334 (N. C. 1858)
[Vol. 39
1930) GIFTS OVER ON DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE
he became of age, it was held, in accordance with the rule quoted
above from Hilliard v. Kea rney, that death before his arrival at
the age of 21 was meant.
23
Meanwhile, however, there was a strong line of autfority
greatly limiting the application of Hilliard v. Kearecy. In Buch-
anan v. Bucnman,239 the testator gave all of his estate not other-
vise disposed of by his will dated 1843 to his son, and provided
that, "should Richmond die without a bodily heir, it is my will
and desire that my son Andrew should have it all." The court
held that the gift over was in operation after the death of the
testator. The court considered that Hilliard v. Kearney was con-
fined to a gift to a class where there was a gift over to the sur-
vivors if any member died without issue 2 0 It further said that
the Statute of 1827, which was enacted after the date of the will
of Hilliard v. Kearney, and which changed the common law pre-
sumption from an indefinite failure of issue to a definite failure
of issue at the death of the first taker, prevented any further
restriction upon the generality of the condition and compelled the
construction that the death without issue of the first taker should
mean such death at any time. The court was obliged to admit
that several of the cases following Hilliard v. Kcarney could not
be justified upon the principle suggested in Theobald on Wills.
The rule of Buchanan v. Buclcnun has been followed and the
condition held to mean death at any time, even though there was
a prior life estate.24' In view of this interesting construction of
the Statute of 1827, it is odd to find the same judge a few months
later, in Fields v. Whitfield,242 following Price 'v. Johnson and
confining the condition to the period before the first taker reached
the given age.
Buchanan v. Buchanan received a fresh impetus from Patter-
semble; Davis v. Parker, 69 N. C. 271 (1873); Burton v. Conigland, 82 N.
C. 99 (1880).
238 Burton v. Conigland, supra note 237.
Accord: Fields v. Whitfield, 101 N. C. 305, 7 S. E. 780 (1888) ; Price v.
Johnson, 90 N. C. 592 (1884) semble.
23999 N. C. 308, 5 S. E. 430 (1888).
240 "Possibly, where there is a gift over, if any members of a class die
without issue, to the survivors, the gift over must take effect, if at all,
before the time when the survivors are to be ascertained." T11E0=, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 746.
24" Dunning v. Burden, 114 N. C. 34, 18 S. E. 969 (1894) ; Trull v. Rail-
road, 151 N. C. 545, 66 S. E. 586 (1909); Perrett v. Bird, 152 N. C. 220,
67 S. E. 507 (1910); Elkins v. Seigler, 154 N. C. 374, 70 S. E. 63G (1911);
Hobgood v. Hobgood, 169 N. C. 485, 86 S. E. 189 (1915); Kirkman v.
Smith, 175 N. C. 579, 96 S. E. 51 (1918).
Rees v. Williams, 164 N. C. 128, 80 S. E. 247 (1913); 165 N. C. 201,
81 S. E. 286 (1914), is to the same effect, although in that case there was
n rrior life estate.
242 10. :. C. 305, 7 S. E. 780 (1888).
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son v. McCormick, '4 where an action to recover land turned
upon the construction of a will which took effect in 1870. Therein
the testator devised the land to his mother for life and after her
death to his "nephews John D. and Clem Jowers to be divided
equally between them. In case they, or either of them die without
issue, it is my will that the property herein bequeathed shall go
to the heirs of Archibald and Gilbert Pattersoit and to the sur-
viving brother John D. or Clem Jowers, as the case may be, to
be equally divided between them." The mother died in 1877;
John D. died in 1904 without leaving any issue surviving him.
It was held that as to John D.'s interest the gift over took effect.
The opinion contains an exhaustive and able discussion of all the
authorities. The case of Hilliard v. Kearney was placed solely
upon the ground that the will there involved took effect prior to
the Act of 1827. The opinion in Patterson v. McCormick leavos
nothing of the doctrine of Hilliard v. Kearney alive at the present
time.14 Furthermore, it is hard to see how those cases which
restricted the condition to a period of division fixed by the attain-
ment of the first taker of a given age can still be law, although
they are not expressly overruled. 215
It should be noted that when the gift over is not upon the
condition of the first taker's dying without issue or children, but
upon some other event not coming within the Statute of 1827,
such as death with children surviving, two recent cases held




A leading case in Pennsylvania is Mickley's Appeal2 4 7 By
will proved in 1878, J. J. Mickley ordered his real estate to be
sold and the proceeds to be added to the remainder of his per-
sonal property, which was then to be divided into equal shares.
He gave one part thereof to each of his sons and daughters. A
gift to a son read "to my son, Henry J. Mickley, or his heirs."
The clause which gave rise to the present controversy was as
follows:
243 177 N. C. 448, 99 S. E. 401 (1919).
244 Patterson v. McCormick has been approved in Love v. Love, 179 N.
C. 115, 101 S. E. 562 (1919); Hines v. Reynolds, 181 N. C. 343, 107 S. E.
144 (1921); Alexander v. Fleming, 190 N. C. 815, 130 S. E. 867 (1925);
American Yarn Co. v. Dewstoe, 192 N. C. 121, 133 S. E. 407 (1926). In
all of these cases there was a prior life estate.
245 Burton v. Conigland; Fields v. Whitfield; Price v. Johnson, all supra'
note 238.
246 Goode v. Hearne, 180 N. C. 475, 105 S. E. 5 (1920) ; Dupree v. Daught-
ridge, 188 N. C. 193, 124 S. E. 148 (1924).
247 92 Pa. 514 (1880).
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"Fourth. I direct that if either of my sons should die without
leaving issue living at the time of his death, the share given to
such son shall pass to and be divided among such of my children
as may be then living, and to the issue of such as may be dead,
such issue, however, taking only the share of their parent. In the
event of the death of either of my said children without issue
living at the time of his or her death, I direct that in the distribu-
tion of the share of such child as aforesaid, the portion thereof
allotted to each'of my daughters shall be held in trust in the same
manner as directed in the provision hereinbefore made for
them." 248
The testator left surviving him three sons and three daughters,
all of whom were living at the time of the litigation. The auditing
judge held that the sons took each a life interest. Upon appeal
the judgment was remanded to the Orphans' Court. That court
decreed that the sons took absolute interests. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court, where the decree of the Orphans'
Court was affirmed. Chief Justice Sharswood said:
"It is very clearly settled, both in England and in this state,
that if a bequest be made to a person absolute in the first in-
stance, and it is provided that in the event of death, or death
without issue, another legatee or legatees shall be substituted to
the share or legacy thus given, it shall be construed to mean
death or death without issue before the testator. The first taker
is always the first object of the testator's bounty, and his absolute
estate is not to be cut down to an estate for life, or what is prac-
tically the same thing, to be subjected to an executory gift over
upon the occurrence of the contingency of death or death without
issue at any future period within the rule against perpetuities
without clear evidence of such an intent: Caldwell v. Skilton, 1
Harris 152; Estate of Mary Biddle, 4 Casey 59; Karker's Appeal,
10 P. F. Smith 141; Fahrney v. Holsinger, 15 P. F. Smith, 388;
McCullough v. Fenton, Id. 418. . . . In the English cases a
distinction is made between devises of realty and bequests of
personalty, which has not been recognized in this state." 2-9
In Caldwell v. SkiltonV-" one of the cases cited by the court,
there was a devise of land to the testator's wife for life, and
then to the children and their heirs in equal shares, and in case
of the death of any of the children its share was to go to its
children, or if a child should die without issue, then to the sur-
viving children and their heirs. The wife died before the tes-
tator. The defendant agreed to purchase the share of one of the
children but refused to take a conveyance because a clear title
could not be conveyed. It should be noted that the gifts over were
in every event. This in substance reduces A's estate in fee to a
life estate. In order to avoid an incongruity it was necessary to
248 Ibid. 515.
249 Ibid. 517-518.
250 13 Pa. 152 (1850).
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fetter the condition to the death of the testator.2 1 And the court,
resting its decision on this ground, held that the grantor under
the deed having survived the testator and the wife took an abso-
lute interest and could convey a clear title.
In the second case cited, Estate of Biddle,222 a will gave prop-
erty, apparently both real and personal, to Anne E. Biddle, the
testatrix's daughter, and in the event of her daughter's "death
without 'children," over to named persons. The question was
whether Anne took an absolute estate or alife estate. The court
held that she took an absolute estate, relying on Caldwell v.
Skilltn, and upon the special context. It is to be noted that the
gift over did not include every event and therefore the case pro-
ceeded upon a mistaken idea of that case. Moreover, it was a dic-
tum only.
In Karker's Appeao2,2" land was devised to A and his heirs, but
if he should happen to die intestate and without issue, then
over. It was held that A took an absolute interest and the gift
over was void as a gift'over on intestacy. The case is obviously
no authority for Mickley's Appead. Finally, Fahrney v. Hols-
inger 2' went on the special context of the will.
Mickley's Appeal .was not cited by the United States Supreme
Court in a case from Pennsylvania, Britton v. Thornton,2 5 where
after a devise to one E. A. Thornton there was a gift over if he
died under age and without issue, and the Court held that the
condition operated after the death of the testator.
Barber v. Pittsburgh Railway Co.-Y0 was also a case from
Pennsylvania decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
question was whether A took an estate tail under a will effective
in 1831, prior to the Act of 1883 making a fee pretumptive, the
Act of 1855 converting estates tail into estates in fee simple,
and the Act of July 9, 1897, which presumed a definite failure
from a gift over on death without issue. There was a devise to
Amanda and "in the event of Amanda dying unmarried, and if
married without offspring by her husband," then among the heirs
of J. B. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a prior eject-
ment action had given Amanda a fee, on the ground that the
gift over was substitutionary.2 " The Supreme Court of the
United States, Mr. Justice Gray writing the opinion, held that
it was not bound to follow the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
for the reason that there was in Pennsylvania no settled rule
251 See Updegraff, op. cit. aupra note 86, at 251.
25228 Pa. 59 (1857).
25360 Pa. 141 (1869).
25465 Pa. 388 (1870).
255 112 U. S. 526, 5 Sup. Ct. 291 (1884).
256 166 U. S. 83, 17 Sup. Ct. 488 (1897).
257 Mitchell v. Pittsburg Ry., 165 Pa. 645, 31 Atl. 67 (1895).
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that "dying without issue" meant such death in the life of the
testator only; and held that an indefinite failure of issue was
meant. Mr. Justice Gray said:
"There is, indeed, a line of cases in that court, in which a de-
vise over, after a devise in fee, has been held to be substitution-
ary, when expressed by such words as if the first taker die
"without children"; (Biddle's Estate, (1857) 28 Penn. St. 59;
McCormick v. McElligott, (1889) 127 Penn. St. 230;) or "with-
out leaving issue living at the time of his death," (Mickley's Ap-
peal, (1880) 92 Penn. St. 514; Stevenson v. Fox, (1889) 125
Penn. St. 568; King v. Frick, (1890) 135 Penn. St. 575; Morrison
v. Truby, (1891) 145 Penn. St. 540;) or "intestate and without
issue," (Karker's Appeal, (1869) 60 Penn. St. 141; Coles v.
Ayres, (1893) 156 Penn. St. 197.) In none of these cases, how-
ever, was the devise so expressed that it could be construed as
creating an estate tail." 2'
Mr. Justice Gray further pointed out 1? that in Schoonmalker
v. Stockton,210 and in Shutt v. Rambo,2G' where the expressions
were respectively "die without heirs" and "die in the lifetime of
the testator," a special context limited the gift over. In addi-
tion to the cases cited by Mr. Justice Gray, there were three
cases where a definite failure of issue was intended and nothing
was said about fettering the condition 'to the testator's death 21
In Fitzwater's Appeal,6 3 the testator bequeathed personalty to
his nephew for life, and after the nephew's death, to his son
Frank, and "should said Frank Fitzwater son of my nephew,
Jacob Fitzwater, die without issue," then over to other relatives.
The court held that the son, upon surviving his father, took an
absolute interest. It is to be noted that, as the case was one of
personalty, no question of estate tail was involved. In Robinson's
Estate,'2 6 4 where the gift over was upon death without issue to
"the surviving child," the condition was confined to the death
of the testator in a case involving land and personalty.
Since Barber v. Pittsburgh Railway Company,= there has
been one case in which an estate tail by implication has been cre-
ated by the gift over.2 6 In two cases 2G7 involving controversies
258 Barber v. Pittsburgh, eupra note 256, at 102, 17 Sup. Ct. at 492.
259 Ibid. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. at 492.
26037 Pa. 461 (1860).
26157 Pa. 149 (1868).
262 Snyder's Appeal, 95 Pa. 174 (1880) ("shall at any time die without
issue"); Parkhurst v. Harrower, 142 Pa. 432, 21 Atl. 826 (1891) ("at time
of his son's death"); Estate of Miller, 145 Pa. 561, 22 Ati. 1044 (1891)
("die before he had any heirs").
26394 Pa. 141 (1880).
264149 Pa. 418, 24 Atl. 297 (1892).
265 Supra note 256.
26 Hannon v. Fliedner, 216 Pa. 470, 65 Atl. 944 (1907); cf. Dilworth v.
Schuykill Co., 219 Pa. 527, 69 Atl. 47 (1908).
267 Todd v. Armstrong, 213 Pa. 570, 62 Atl. 1114 (1906); Waldron v.
Wahl, 286 Pa. 237, 133 Atl. 252 (1926).
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over land, a definite failure of issue was found, and the result in
Mickley's Appeal 268 was not followed. In Mebus's Estate, 9 the
court said that a special context made the death of the first tes-
tator the time intended for the happening of the condition. And
in Shearer v. Miller 270 and Sharpless' Estate'71 in both of which
land was involved, a special context confined the condition to
the death of a life tenant whose estate preceded the one in
question.
Mickley's Appeal was followed in cases involving land where
the conditions were respectively "die unmarried and without
issue"; 272 and "living at death." 273 In Flick v. Oil Co.,214 involv-
ing a will of land, there was a gift over, if the first taker "depart
this life without issue," to an other for life and then to six
named persons, and Mickley's Appeal was again followed.
The same result was reached in two cases of personal property,
in one of which the words "leaving" and "survivors" were
usedT" and in the other of which the words were "the shares of
any deceasing child leaving no lawful issue to increase the
shares of the survivors." 270
RHODE ISLAND
Prior to the Rhode Island Statute of 1896 277 the law of Rhode
Island was the common law rule of indefinite failure of issue. 27 8
It made no difference that the gift over was to survivors, at least
so far as land was concerned. 20 Forth v. Chapman 28 0 was also
followed in regard to land where the gift over was upon "leav-
ing no issue." 281 The expression "after his death," however,
probably had a qualifying effect, both as to real and personal
20S Supra note 247.
26) 273 Pa. 505, 117 Atl. 340 (1922).
270 185 Pa. 149, 39 Atl. 846 (1898).
71 209 Pa. 409, 58 Atl. 806 (1904).
-2.2 Cooper v. Leaman, 212 Pa. 564, 61 Atl. 1106 (1905); Ault v. Karch,
220 Pa. 366, 69 Atl. 857 (1908).
2 7 Neubert v. Colwell, 219 Pa. 248, 68 Ati. 673 (1908); Stark's Estate,
264 Pa. 232, 107 Atl. 699 (1919).
274 188 Pa. 317, 41 Atl. 535 (1898).
275 Moorhead's Estate, 180 Pa. 119, 36 Atl. 647 (1897).
271; Freeman's Estate, 281 Pa. 190, 126 Atl. 270 (1924).
2-, R. I. GEN. LAWS (1896) 202, § 24.
- 8 Osborne v. Shrieve, 3 Mas. 391 (C. C. D. R. I. 1824); Arnold v.
Brown, 7 R. I. 188 (1862) ; Sutton v. Miles, 10 R. I. 348 (1872) ; Brownell
v. Brownell, 10 R. I. 509 (1873).
279 Burrough v. Foster, 6 R. I. 534 (1860).
280 Supra note 27.
281 Osborne v. Shrieve, supra note 278; Holden v. Wells, 18 R. I. 802, 31
Atl. 265 (1895).
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property.2 2 It is to be noted that an earlier case involving land
held that there was an indefinite failure of issue, although the
gift over was conditioned upon the words, "if he has no lawful
issue after him." 283
Although Rhode Island maintained the orthodox rule until late
in its legal history, in 1894 Harris v. Dyer 28" confined the con-
dition to the death of the testator. The testator, by a will of
1887, divided his realty among his children in equal shares and
provided that "in case of the death of any of the six named heirs
to the residue of my estate, without leaving lawful issue, the
survivors will inherit the portion of the deceased party but in
the case of any one of the six parties named leaving lawful issue,
then they are to inherit the parents' portion." The question in
the case was whether the devisee, who survived the testator, could
convey a good title to the land. The court held that he could,
upon the ground that the gifts over were conditioned upon events
which were intended to happen before the death of the testator.
The opinion relied upon English, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
North Carolina cases, and to a slight extent upon the special
context. It is to be noted that the gifts over embraced all con-
tingencies, but this was not relied upon by the court. It is hard
to reconcile this case with the opinion less than a year later in
Holden v. Wells,2185 where an indefinite failure of issue was held
to exist with reference to a devise of land, and no question was
raised in regard to confining the condition to the testator's
death. Hariis v. Dyer was followed by In re Johnson,;
" and
approved in Newport Trust Co. v. chappell.
287
SOUTH CAROLINA
Prior to the Statute of 1853 28 the gift over on death without
issue imported a definite failure of issue.2 -82  Slight changes ap-
pearing on the face of the will, however, resulted in the narrow
282 Swinburne, Petitioner, 16 R. I. 208, 14 Atl. 850 (1888) (personalty);
Wells v. Fairbanks, 6 R. I. 474 (1860) (realty).
283 Whitford v. Armstrong, 9 R. I. 394 (1870); cf. Lippett v. Hopkins,
1 Gall. 454 (C. C. D. R. I. 1813).
The writer of the opinion in Swinburne, Petitioner, supra note 282, Dur-
fee, C. J., was a member of the court which decided Whitford v. Armstrong,
supra.
284 18 R. 1. 540, 28 AtI. 971 (1894).
2s 18 R. 1. 802, 31 Ati. 265 (1895).
286 23 R. I. 111, 49 Atl. 695 (1901) (land).
2sr 40 R. I. 383, 101 Atl. 323 (1917) (personalty).
-SS S. C. STAT. (1853) 298.
289 Graham v. Moore, f3 S. C. 115 (1879); Mangum v. Piester, 16 S. C.
316 (1881) (both dealing with wills prior to 1853).
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construction of definite failure at the death of the first taker.20
Forth v. Chapman 291 was followed as to realty and personalty. 22
A gift over to "surviving" persons limited the gift, both real and
personal property, to a definite failure of issue.
29 3
During the first half of the nineteenth century there seemed
no tendency in the South Carolina cases to confine the contin-
gency of a gift over on failure of issue to the testator's death.
In Yates v. Mitchell,29 ' where the contingency was "without leav-
ing lawful begotten issue living at the time of his, her, or their
death," such condition was taken generally. The cases of Vidal
v. Verdier 295 and Dehay v. Porcher 296 clearly go upon the special
context of the particular wills involved. Presley v. Davis,91 'how-
ever, confined the following contingency to the death of the tes-
ator: "if any should die or make their exit without lawful issue,
then their portions are to be equally divided among the remainder
of the aforesaid children," and decided that such condition should
not be operative after the testator's death. The court relied upon
Schoppert v. Gillam,298 where a gift over after a life estate to
surviving children of a third person was held to mean children
surviving the life tenant, on the authority of Cripps v. Wolcott. 9
Blum v. Evans 00 held that a gift over on death without issue
should be confined to the life of the testator's wife who took
a prior life estate. But in Owings v. Wood,30 1 such a gift over
was taken generally, although the court's attention was not par-
ticularly called to the point. 02
290 Clifton v. Haig, 4 Des. Eq. 330 (S. C. 1812).
291 Supra note 27.
292 Mazyck v. Vanderhorst, 1 Bailey Eq. 48, 52 (S. C. 1828). This case
was followed as to land. Adams v. Chaplin, I Hill Ch. 265, 268 (S. C.
1830); Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Strob. Eq. 101 (S. C. 1847); Hay v. Hay,
3 Rich. Eq. 384 (S. C. 1851) ; cf. Gregg v. Harllee, Dud. Eq. 42 (S. C. 1837).
So far as Beresford v. Elliott, 1 Des. Eq. 183 (S. C. 1790) holds the
contrary as to land, it must be considered overruled.
293 DeTreville v. Ellis, 1 Bailey Eq. 40 (S. C. 1827); Stevens v. Patterson,
Bailey Eq. 42 (S. C. 1829); Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. C. 262 (1895).
294 1 Rich. Eq. 265 (S. C. 1844).
291 Spear Eq. 402 (S. C. 1344) (all the contingencies were provided for).
296 1 Rich. Eq. 266 (S. C. 1845).
2977 Rich. Eq. 105 (S. C. 1854).
293 6 Rich. Eq. 83 (S. C. 1853).
219 4 Madd. 11 (1819).
"' 10 S. C. 56 (1877). The case was elaborately argued. The court re-
licd on Vidal v. Verdier, supra note 295, and earlier English cases. The
opinion has been properly criticized. See Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV.
512, 515, n. 14.
301 105 S. C. 177, 89 S. E. 667 (1916).
302 Chaplin v. Turner, 2 Rich. Eq. 136 (S. C. 1846); Durant v. Nash, 30
S. C. 184, 9 S. E. 19 (1888) ; Marshall v. Marshall, 42 S. C. 436, 20 S. E.
298 (1894).
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TENNESSEE
In Tennessee prior to 1852 1'3 the common law rule of indefinite
failure of issue was adopted both as to realty and personalty.3 0'
Little, however, was necessary to cut down the gift over to a
failure of issue at the death of the first taker. If the limitation
over was to persons "surviving" the first taker, such a result
was reached both as to realty and personalty.-' 0 And a definite
failure was also found upon special context in several cases.300
Armstrong v. Douglass 30T arose under the last clause of the
statute of 1852 which provides that there shall be an indefinite
failure of issue if the intention "of such limitation be otherwise
expressly and plainly declared in the face of the deed or vll
created." The court found as to the 15th clause in the will under
consideration an indefinite failure of issue expressed on the face
of the will. This is the only case that the writer has found involv-
ing a similar statutory clause in the United States.
More recent cases, however, show a tendency to confine a gift
over on death without issue to the lifetime of the testator. In
Vaughn v. Cator,3C'8 such a gift over of personalty was confined
to the testator's lifetime upon the authority of Montagu v. Nu-
cela,.31w*vhere, however, the gifts over exhausted all contingen-
cies. In Meacham v. Graham,"10 the gift over was "without living
children." This contingency was cut down to the testator's death
on tlfe authority of Vaughn v. Cator and New York cases. Both
these cases were approved in Katzenberger v. Weaver,312 where
there was a gift to the first taker's children if he died leaving
children.
Meek v. Trotter,32 where there was a preceding life estate,
303 Tenn. Laws 1851-2, c. 91, p. 113, § 3.
3 4 Randolph v. Wendel, 4 Sneed. 646 (Tenn. 1857); Kirk v. Furgerson,
6 Coldw. 479' (Tenn. 1869) (realty); Bowman v. Tucker, 3 Humph. 648
(Tenn. 1842); Chester v. Greer, 5 Humph. 26 (Tenn. 1844) (realty and
personalty); Hamner v. Hamner, 3 Head. 398 (Tenn. 1859) (realty and
personalty).
30: Lewis v. Claiborne, 5 Yerg. 369 (Tenn. 1829); Brown v. Hunt, 12
Heisk. 404 (Tenn. 1873) ; see Booker v. Booker, 5 Humph. 505, 510 (Tenn.
1844).
306 Williams v. Turner, 10 Yerg. 287 (Tenn. 1837) ; Bramlet v. Bates, 1
Sneed. 554 (Tenn. 1853) (presented same facts and reached same result
as Fells v. Brown, supra note 7) ; Gray v. Bridgeforth, 33 Miss. 312 (1857).
307 89 Tenn. 219, 14 S. W. 604 (1890).
33 85 Tenn. 302, 2 S. W. 262 (1886).
309 1 Russ. 165 (1826).
310 98 Tenn. 190, 29 S. W. 12 (1897).
31 110 Tenn. 620, 75 S. W. 937 (1903) ; cf. Stones v. Blaney, 3 Tenn. Ch.
731 (1878) (gift over on death without issue was confined on the special
context to death before the first taker reached 35).
322 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S. W. 176 (1915).
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contained a dictum that the gift over should be confined to the
life of the life tenant. The earlier cases were approved and
would have been followed had there been no intervening estate.
Anderson v. Lucas3s1 involved a devise of land made in 1843
in which there was a gift if the first taker died without lawful
issue. The court followed the earlier Tennessee cases which
represented the law at that date and found that an indefinite
failure of issue was intended.
VERMONT
In Chaplin v. Doty,s14 a gift over upon the first taker's death
"without leaving lawful issue" was construed to mean "without
having had lawful issue," so that when the legatee survived the
testator and begat a child, the gift to the former was held
to be absolute. It was assumed that the condition applied after,
as well as before, the testator's death. In Dwight v. Eastnwn,°11
there was a devise of land to the testator's son and daughter in
equal shares. The testator provided that each share shuld de-
scend to the issue of each of the testator's children, and if no
issue to the issue of the other. It was held that the condition
operated after the death of the testator. Nothing was said about
the exhaustion of all contingencies.
In re Wells's Estate 316 involved a devise of land to the. tes-
tator's widow for life, and then to the testator's daughter for life,
and then to the heirs of his daughter's body. The will then pro-
vided that "should my beloved daughter, Lucia R. Ward, die leav-
ing no heirs of her body, or shall I, at any future time fail to
have heirs of my body, then to a religious society." .The deed was
held void for remoteness because the testator intended that it
should vest on the death of the daughter without heirs of her
body then surviving. But in In Re Thayer's Estate 3,, it was said
extra-judicially: "True, the rule must not be overlooked that
words of survivorship are presumed to relate to the death of the
testator, if fairly capable of such construction."
WISCONSIN
Wisconsin follows New York where there is no preceding life
estate in confining the contingency to the life of the testator.318
313 140 Tenn. 336, 204 S. W. 989 (1918).
31460 Vt. 712, 15 Atl. 362 (1888).
31z 62 Vt. 398, 20 AtI. 594 (1890).
311 69 Vt. 388, 38 Ati. 83 (1897).
31- 99 Vt. 204, 206, 130 At]. 683-684; cf. Shepard's Heirs v. Shepard's
Estate, 60 Vt. 109, 14 Atl. 536 (1888).
318 Lovass v. Olson, 92 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 605 (1896); Patton v. Lud-
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In Chesterfield v. Hoskiv,310 there was a gift to the testator's son
for life and, in case of his death without issue and leaving a
widow surviving, then to the widow; but if he leave issue, the
issue to take. The court held that this meant death after the
testator.
In Korn v. Friz,3 20 there was a preceding life estate, and the
court took the condition generally upon slight special context.
That Korn v. Friz went upon the construction of the will is
pointed out in Hohnbach v. Hohnbach,321 where there was a pre-
ceding life estate without special context, and the court confined
the contingency to the death of the life tenant.
SUMMARY
The unfortunate rule fettering a gift over on death without
issue to the period of distribution exists in Alabama, Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee
and Wisconsin. It probably exists also in New York and South
Carolina. It appears in part in Kentucky and New Jersey. Geor-
gia, Illinois and Vermont may be classified as doubtful states.
The statute presuming a definite failure of issue at the death
of the first taker has hardly ever been discussed in these author-
ities. Even if the condition is to be confined to the death of the
testator, or of a prior life tenant, the question might well still
be open whether A's death without issue is intended to be upon
A's indefinite failure of issue before the testator or the life
tenant.
Perhaps the most sensible suggestion is made in Buchanan v.
Buechnwn, 322 that the statute itself precludes reference to any
other period than the death of the first taker. The effect of this
construction would be to do away entirely, in those states having
such an act, with the anomalous body of authority just consid-
ered at length.2 3
ington, 103 Wis. 629, 79 N. W. 1073 (1899); Owens' Will, 164 Wis. 260,
159 N. W. 906 (1916); Will of O'Brien, 173 Wis. 41, 180 N. W. 141 (1920).
319 133 Wis. '68, 113 N. W. 647 (1907).
320 128 Wis. 428, 107 N. W. 659 (1906).
321 151 Wis. 487, 139 N. W. 731 (1913).
322 Supra note 239.
323 Cf. Siegwarth's Estate, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 622 (1907) with Buchanan
v. Buchanan, supra note 239. The cases seem to conflict. See Updegraff,
op. cit. supra note 86, at 255-256.
In Dowd v. Scally, 184 N. W. 340 (Iowa 1921), after a gift to the testa-
tor's wife for life there was a remainder to his children: but should any
of his children die without issue before his wife, then to the survivors of
them on her death: and should any die without leaving issue, the issue
on his wife's death were to take their parent's share. One of the testator's
children died after his death and before his wife, leaving two children who
died unmarried before the life tenant. It was held that the testator's child
had died with issue and the heir of that child's deceased issue took under
the gift to them in the will.
